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Abstract
Russia possesses  a sophisticated  science  and  technology  closed cities or isolated science/atomic  cities).
(S&T)  infrastructure  (research  capability,  technically  Overcominig  these inefficiencies  and adjusting the S&T
trained workforce,  and  technical  research  universities)  system  to the demanids  of a market economy will reqtiire
which,  even  today,  is a world  leader  in many fields.  a major program  of institutional and  sectoral  reform.
Despite this world  class basic  research  capacity,  Russia's  Part I of this paper  describes the ambiguous  legacy  of
exports are  primarily  raw materials.  Ar a trime whien  the Soviet  S&T systeimi  and the status of the  Russian S&T
wealth depends to an increasing  degree on  knowledge,  sector after  10 vears of transition.  Part 11  describes the
Russia does not have an effective  svstem  for converting  evolutioll of the Russian  system  of intellectual  property
its scientific  capacity into wealth.  rights  protection from  Soviet times to the present and
Russia's S&T resources are isolated  bureaucratically  argues that Russia  will  never develop a successful
(they are deployed  in the  rigid hierarchical  system  commercialization  program until  it clarifies  the
devised  in  the  I  920s  to mobilize  resources  for rapid  ownership  of the large stock  of intellectual  property
state-planned  industrial  development  and  national  funded  with  federal  budget resources. Part  III  outlines  a
defense),  functionally  (there  are few links between  the  comprehenisive  1  0-poinlt  sectoral  reform program  to
supply of S&8T  output by  research  institutes and  the  improve the efficiency  of government  research  and
demand  for S&T by  Russian or foreign  enterprises),  and  development  spending and  link the  Russian S&T system
geographically  (maniv assets are  located  in formerly  withi  market  forces.
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Forty  years  ago,  Korea,  Israel,  China,  and  Finland  were  relatively  non-industrialized,
scientifically  unsophisticated,  raw  material  exporters.  Wood  and  forest  products
constituted  70%  of  Finland's  exports  during  the  1960s  and  agricultural  products
constituted  approximately  70%  of Israel's  exports  during  that  same  decade.  Today,
knowledge intensive products constitute more than 50% of each country's exports.
Over  the  course  of several  decades,  each  country  managed  to  adopt  and  implement
different,  but  internally  coherent,  economic  development  policies.  These  policies
addressed  a wide range of issues,  all designed to increase  the knowledge  content of the
country's  economic  base.I  These  included  (i)  policies  to  foster  private  sector
development,  improve  the  productivity  and  competitiveness  of such  "old  economy"
sectors as manufacturing and agriculture,  and stimulate the development of new high tech
enterprises,  (ii)  programs  to  create  an  education  system  designed  to  give  students  the
cognitive  and technical  skills that they would need  to prosper  and thrive in the global
knowledge  economy,  and  (iii)  policies  to  commercialize  the  output  of the  national
research and development system, thereby converting knowledge into wealth.
As a broad generalization, this is probably an accurate description of the policies that any
country must pursue if it hopes to become an active, prosperous participant in the global
knowledge  economy.  But  Russia may be  facing a  unique challenge.  Forty  years  ago
Finland, Korea,  Israel,  and China,  all started with a relatively underdeveloped  enterprise
sector AND an underdeveloped science and technology (S&T) base.
The  "starting point"  for Russia,  by contrast,  is a combination of a depressed  economic
base characterized by a large stock of  rapidly depreciating,  obsolete industrial capital, and
a  sophisticated  science  and  technology  infrastructure  (research  capability,  technically
trained  workforce,  and  technical  research  universities)  which,  even  today,  is  a world
leader in many fields.  And yet despite this world  class capacity in many fields of basic
science, Russia's  exports are primarily raw materials.  According to a recent report by the
Ministry  of Industry,  Science  and  Technology,  "Russia's  share  of the world  [export]
market of high-tech products  does not  exceed 0.3%,  which is  130 times lower than the
U.S. share." 2
For details, see presentations  on Hungary,  Finland, South Korea, and Israel at the Helsinki  Seminar
on "Innovation  Policy And The Valorisation  Of Science And Technology  In Russia,"  March 1 -2,
2001  available at the web site address http://www.oecd.ora/dsti/sti/
2  "Role  of the  State  in  Creating  a  Favorable  Innovation  Climate  in  Russia,"  Background  Report
Prepared  by  the  Ministry  of Industry  Science  and  Technology  for  the  Helsinki  Seminar  on
Innovation Policy  and  the  Valorisation  of Science  and  Technology  in  Russia,  March  1-2,  2001,
Paragraph 3.The  challenge  facing Russia,  as defined by the Government's  economic  reform program
is to develop  a strategy for transforming Russia from a raw material exporter to a world
class producer of knowledge  intensive products3:
"Over  its  many  years  of  history  Russian  science  has  made  an  inestimable
contribution  to  the  development  of our country.  To a  considerable  extent  Russia
owes  its  status  as  a  world  power  to  the  accomplishments  of Russian  science.
Russia  has  the  potential  to  develop  in  practically  every  area  of scientific  and
technological  progress.  This is not only an object of national  pride but a strategic
resource capable of providing huge economic benefits to Russia.
At the same time, in a situation in which state funding has been drastically reduced
and  [state]  production  orders have  declined,  science  has  almost  totally exhausted
domestic resources for its development.  Today the question of whether Russia will
be a state with a powerful economy and high-technology  industry,  whether  it will
restore  a strong science,  and whether Russian scientists will regain their positions
in the world scientific community is more urgent than it has ever been."
On  one  level,  Russia's  starting  point  makes  this  task  less  daunting.  Russia  already
possesses a sophisticated S&T base and a core of highly educated  scientific personnel.  It
has to preserve and transform what already  exists rather than devote decades  to creating
this critical resource from scratch.  But on the other hand, Russia has to overcome a long
legacy  of institutional  rigidities  and  dysfunctional  institutional  arrangements  inherited
from  the  Soviet  system.  Currently,  many  of the  S&T  resources  are  isolated  both
bureaucratically  (in  the  sense  that  they  are  deployed  in the  rigid hierarchical  system
devised in the 1920s to mobilize resources for rapid state-planned  industrial development
and national  defense),  functionally  (in  the  sense  that  there  are  few  links  between  the
supply  of S&T  output  by research  institutes  and  the demand  for  S&T  by Russian  or
foreign  enterprises),  and  geographically  (in  the  sense  that  many  assets  are  located  in
formerly  closed  cities or isolated  science/atomic  cities).  Overcoming  the inefficiencies
embedded  in these sunk costs incurred during the socialist period and adjusting the S&T
system to the demands of a market economy will require a major program of institutional
and enterprise  reform which, in turn,  will make the task more daunting, although no less
necessary.
For example,  among the challenges that Russia faces are to:
*  Transform  the  wealth  generated  from  natural  resource  activities  into
investments  that will  foster the emergence  of a knowledge  based economy.
As will be  discussed in  greater  detail below, many of the current government
policy papers  and academic  research monographs  devoted  to this  subject  can
best be  described  as  "logical  wishfulness."  Since  natural  resource  rents  are
currently the primary source of wealth and capital accumulation,  it is logical to
assume  that profits  from  natural  resource  extraction  can  serve  as the primary
3  Development  Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2010, Chapter 3.3, 'The  Innovation-Based
Development of the Economy,"  Moscow,  2000.
-2 -source of investment  funds  for high tech activities.  But what public or private
sector institutions and policies will transfer these surpluses  from one sector to
another?  Industrial  business  groups?  Private  capital  markets  and  venture
funds?  And is the transition from a resource extraction economy to a high tech
economy simply a question of redistributing  financial  flows?  Or will it require
fundamental  changes  in  the  system  of  commercializing  research  and
development  and  substantial  improvements  in  the  capacity  of  Russian
enterprises  to  absorb  and  use  technology?  It  is  not  clear  that  GOR  is
contemplating these questions, let alone developing coherent answers.
*  Commercialize  the  country's  research  capability  and  harness  Russia's
S&T  assets  to the job of creating a modern, knowledge  intensive  domestic
economy.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  Russian  enterprises  prefer  to
import  high  tech,  knowledge  intensive  equipment.  There  seems  to be  little
domestic demand for Russian made equipment and very little high quality, high
tech manufacturing  equipment actually produced  in Russia.  At the same time,
science intensive  enterprises  and research  institutes typically  find that there is
relatively  little  demand  for their  goods  and  services  inside Russia.  Instead,
their most lucrative markets seem to be outside Russia, either in other emerging
markets  or  occasionally,  in  Western  Europe  or  the US.  Thus,  while  most
countries  are integrating  their  S&T  sector  with the development  of a vibrant,
globally  competitive  domestic  enterprise  sector,  Russia  would  appear  to  be
developing  two  independent  systems  - an enterprise  sector  that  occasionally
finds  the financial  resources to  purchase  technology  and knowledge  intensive
equipment  from  abroad  and an  S&T  sector  that occasionally  manages  to  sell
Russian  technology  and knowledge  intensive  equipment  abroad.  Is  this  the
most effective  way to develop  a modem,  knowledge  economy?  Should these
systems  be  more  closely  integrated?  More  importantly,  given  the  relative
technological  backwardness of most of Russian agriculture and industry, at this
stage  in  its  development,  should  Russian  S&T  policy  emphasize  the
consumption  of imported technology or the production  and export of domestic
technology.  Can Russia remain a technological  powerhouse  if the  rest of the
economy cannot compete in the global marketplace?
Develop  linkages  between  science  intensive  SMEs  and  large national and
international firms which  can help  local  firms develop  a high value  added
niche in the global  value chain.  Enterprises do not exist in isolation.  As they
strive  to  serve  ever  more  sophisticated  customers  with  more  technically
demanding  requirements  -- in other words, as they attempt to find higher value
added niches  in the national  or international  value  chain  -- they must upgrade
their skills  and manufacturing  sophistication.  Unfortunately,-linkages  with the
sort of national or international  enterprises that can lift local enterprises to ever
higher positions on the global value  chain are still rather rare in Russia, in part
because  Russian  firms  generally  do  not  have  the  management  and  strategic
planning skills  to develop  these commercial  connections.  Consequently,  even
those  firms engaged  in high tech commercial  production may be  trapped  in a
dead end if all they are doing is exploiting their inherited intellectual capital and
not investing in R&D or further technological  upgrading,  And yet, investing in
- 3-R&D  or  technological  upgrading  makes  no  sense  if Russian  firms  have  no
access to sophisticated  customers who are  demanding these higher value added
services  and  financial  resources  --  either  from  commercial  banks  or retained
earnings  --  to  finance  the investments  that  would be  required  to  serve  these
customers.  The manner in which these linkage/value  chain issue are addressed
will have a major impact on whether Russia makes a successful  transition to a
knowledge economy.
*  Encourage  Educated  Russians  to  Live,  Work  and  Invest  in  Russia.
Applications  to  elite  technical  universities  in  Russia  are  at  an  all-time  high.
Normally,  this would be  a positive  development,  a  sign  that  students believe
that  there is a productive  rewarding future  in Russian science.  But anecdotal
survey evidence  suggests that  students  are  enrolling  in elite Russian  technical
universities because they believe it is the best way to get a visa for entry to the
US  and  a job  with  leading  US  high  tech  firms.  Until  Russia  manages  to
convince these students to use their skills and training  domestically  -- in other
words  until  it  creates  a  business  climate  and  business  opportunities  that
discourages  wholesale  brain  drain  --  Russia  will  have  difficulty  making  a
successful transition to a Knowledge Economy.
*  Improve  the  Business  Climate.  Improving  the  business  and  investment
environment so that both Russian and foreign businessmen are willing to invest
in  Russia  is  an  absolute  prerequisite  for  supporting  the  transition  to  a
Knowledge Economy.  Without  improvements  in this area, including measures
designed to ease the entry of new high tech firms, it is unlikely that Russia will
be  able  to  tackle  such  items  as  reversing  the  brain  drain,  establishing  more
productive linkages  between SMEs and  larger national  and international  firms,
or commercializing Russian innovations.
Why is it important for Russia to address these challenges and answer these questions?
*  The  existing  S&T  base  is  a  wasting  resource  that  has  already  eroded
significantly  and  is in danger  of continuing  to  erode  rapidly.  Russia  cannot
maintain  a  world  class  scientific  establishment  if it  is  built  on  a  declining
industrial base.  As one observer  from INTAS  noted recently,  "To  date,  rather
than  the  S&T  sector  pulling up  the  rest  of the  economy,  what  we  have
witnessed  in p ost-Soviet  Russia  is the  rest  of the  economy pulling down  the
S&T sector."  [emphasis in original.]
*  Unlike  the  fixed  capital  stock  sunk  into  obsolete,  poorly  located  industrial
facilities,  the  existing scientific  human capital  stock is potentially  much more
flexible  and  mobile.  This  can be  both  a virtue  and a  defect.  Like  financial
resources,  it can be a source of capital flight or brain drain.  But it can also be a
potential engine of economic growth and private sector development if properly
Daniel Berger,  "The Russian  Science & Technology  Sector:  Quo Vadis?," unpublished  manuscript,
Novemrber 2000.
-4  -harnessed  alongside  appropriate public  sector  management  and private  sector
development policies.
*  Ignoring the S&T sector as a unique factor of production -- on a par with land,
labor and capital  -- is tantamount to ignoring the one resource which is the key
to development  and prosperity in the 21st century "knowledge economy."
*  Emerging  evidence  from  a  recent  OECD  international  survey  shows  that
inherited inefficiencies and contracting budgets are combining not only to affect
education  access  and  quality  but are  beginning  to have  an adverse  effect  on
student outcomes  which  in turn will  affect the availability of a well  educated
supply  of  human  capital,  familiar  with  new  technology  and  capable  of
economic  creativity.  If Russia  does  not  act  soon  to  reverse  these  trends,  it
could  lose  the  one  factor  of production  that  is  critical  to  success  in  the
Knowledge  Economy  --  a  well  educated  labor  force  that is  capable  of both
consuming and producing world class knowledge.
How  can  Russia  cultivate  productive  linkages  between  its  S&T  resources  and  its
enterprises,  especially  given the preponderance  in Russia of large  industrial  enterprises
and isolated S&T institutions?  The crucial lesson from Finland and Israel, among others
seems to be that a  successful  S&T strategy  should be integrated  into an  overall  private
sector development and enterprise development/restructuring  strategy.
This integration is currently lacking in Russia.  The S&T sector does not have a history of
communicating  with  the  enterprise  sector  and  responding  to  its  needs.  But  until
investment  in the  enterprise  sector  gathers  momentum,  enterprises  will  not generate  an
effective  demand  for Russian S&T.  Thus, in many respects,  "solving the Russian S&T
problem"  is inextricably linked to resolving the enterprise restructuring  problem, with all
that  implies  for  improving  the  investment  climate,  improving  public  and  corporate
governance,  reducing  administrative  barriers  to  entry  and  exit,  improving  financial
intermediation,  improving  creditor  rights in  bankruptcy,  etc.  At  the  same  time,  given
Russia's  historical legacy  of institutional  compartmentalization,  special  attention  should
also  be  paid  to  developing  linkages  between  the  S&T  sector  and  enterprises.  The
objective  should not only be to ensure  that the process of restructuring  the S&T  sector
proceeds  in pace with the process of restructuring the enterprise  sector but to ensure that
the restructuring of the enterprise sector drives the restructuring of the S&T sector.
This  paper  will  examine  the  current  status  of  the  Russian  S&T  system  and  the
government's  proposals  for  reform.  Part I  will  discuss  the  origins  of the  current
problem.  It will  suggest  that the  Soviet Union bequeathed  Russia with an  ambiguous
legacy  in  terms of S&T  - a legacy  of world  class  leadership  in many  fields  of basic
science and a laggard in almost all fields of industrial innovation.  It will also suggest that
this legacy was not an accident, but an inevitable consequence  of the Soviet system. This
section will also discuss the evolution of the Russia S&T system in the ten years since the
break-up  of the  Soviet  Union.  Despite  the profound  changes  that have  taken  place  to
date,  the  paper  will  suggest  that  this  has been  primarily  a  process  of change  without
transition  and reform.  Thus,  despite  the  many policy initiatives  that were  inaugurated
-5-during  this  period,  by  themselves,  these  initiatives  will  not be  sufficient  to revive  the
S&T system or the Russian economy.
An important focus of the govemment's reform program  concerns the issue of intellectual
property rights.  Part H will  suggest that the intellectual  property discussion in Russia
needs  to be viewed  from two complementary but radically different  perspectives.  The
first,  and most commonly discussed  perspective (in the west)  involves the protection  of
western IP in Russia.  From the vantage point of this prism, Russia adopted world  class
IP legislation in  1992  and 1993.  For the most part, it complies with intemational norms
and the membership  requirements  of the WTO.  The weakness with Russia's IP laws lies
in  compliance  and  enforcement,  but  not  the  laws  themselves.  However,  from  the
Govemment's  perspective,  the most urgent  issue is not protecting  westem  IP in Russia,
as important as that may be, but rather,  clarifying the ownership status of those objects of
intellectual  property  that were funded  with  Soviet  and Russian  budget  resources.  The
current IP legislation, which  was drafted  and approved before the privatization  program
and radically  altered  Russian property relations,  does not address these  issues.  This has
created  a  legislative  void which  leaves  a  significant portion  of the Russian  IP  legacy
unprotected  and  makes  it  difficult  to  commercialize  this  stock  of knowledge.  This
section of the report  will attempt  to illuminate  the main contours of the ongoing  policy
debate regarding  ownership of budget funded IP and the govemment's  desire to ensure
that  ownership  ambiguities  are  resolved  so  that  this  IP  can  be  "introduced  into  the
economic turnover."
Finally,  Part HI will review the govemment's progress  in restructuring  the S&T sector.
This  section  will  argue  that  GOR  has  implemented  a  variety  of noteworthy  S&T
restructuring programs  designed to increase the flow of venture capital investment in the
Russian economy and accelerate  the growth of high tech SMEs.  It is difficult to quarrel
with any of these policy initiatives.  Many should be promoted and scaled up.  Yet by the
govemment's  own criteria, success  has been elusive.  What is missing?  This concluding
section will argue that there have been two principal missing ingredients.  The  first is a
thorough  reform  of the  S&T  sector  itself.  Among  other  things,  this  would  include
reforms of the Russian Academy of Sciences  and related  reforms to improve the overall
efficiency of government S&T spending.  The second is a long term  strategy for reviving
the  enterprise  sector  and,  even more  importantly,  linking the restructuring  of the  S&T
sector to the revival of the enterprise sector.  If it is true that a healthy S&T sector cannot
exist in the midst of an unhealthy enterprise sector,  it is also  true that the revival of the
S&T  sector  will  not  occur  without  a  demand  by  domestic  Russian  enterprises  for
innovation.  This demand  is beginning to emerge, but much more needs to be done to link
the S&T sector with the enterprise sector.  The paper will conclude by suggesting several
possible options for strengthening these linkages.
- 6 -II.  EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN S&T SYSTEM
A.  Science  in the USSR:  The Ambiguous Legacy.
The  Soviet Union bequeathed Russia  an ambiguous  S&T  legacy,  a  sector  described by
one observer as "cutting edge and obsolete at the same time."
That  the  Soviet  S&T  sector  was  cutting  edge  in  many  areas  of basic  research  and
engineering  is beyond doubt.  The Soviet S&T system could boast of world class research
in several highly competitive  scientific/technological  areas including physics,  astronomy
and  space  research,  chemistry  and  new  materials,  life  sciences,  earth  sciences,
mathematics  and computer  sciences,  new technologies  ranging  from hydraulic  and  gas
turbines, laser applications, high frequency plasma. This was coupled with a high level of
public  R&D  expenditure,  a  highly  educated  population  and  a  large  corps  of  elite
scientists/engineers,  with  a special concentration  in basic research.  In  1990, the number
of R&D personnel in the ex-Soviet  Union exceeded 2.8 million, of which just under two
million were  in Russia proper.  That same year, Russia was the home of more than 4600
R&D institutes and devoted 2.03% of GDP to R&D expenditures,  a comparable effort to
that found in the OECD.6
Yet these undeniable scientific achievements did little to improve the overall health of the
economy  and may have even contributed to the economic  stagnation that was beginning
to  manifest  itself by  the  late-1970s  and  early-1980s.  The  Soviet  R&D  system  was
explicitly  designed to  work within  a command economy  that was  mobilizing  resources
for  national  defense  and  rapid  centrally  planned  industrialization.  Despite  repeated
attempts  at reform during the waning years  of the Soviet Union,  the Soviet S&T  system
could not respond,  in terms of greater flexibility and innovativeness,  to the requirements
of a  modern,  high  tech  economy.7 To  the  extent  that  the  organizational  structure
bequeathed to Russia by the Soviet Union has not yet been reformed and overhauled,  the
inefficiencies  and inflexibility  of the Soviet  system will continue to hinder development
of the Russian economy.
The Soviet S&T system was a rigid, highly stratified, hierarchical  administrative  system.
In visual terms, it can be viewed as a series of parallel  silos, with  few if any linkages or
communication  and  feedback  channels  between  silos.  The  Soviet  S&T  system  was
5  Ksenia  Gonchar,  Research  and  Development  (R&D)  Conversion  in  Russia,  Report  10,  Bonn
International Center for Conversion, May  1997, p. 71.
6  All data are from Russia:  A Science  and Technology  Profile, The British Council,  1999, Chapter 3.
The profile itself was written  and  compiled by Dr. Leonid  Gokhberg,  Deputy Director,  Center for
Science Research and Statistics, Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology.
7  See  for  example,  Jack  Martens,  "Measuring  Soviet  Performance  in  Industrial  Innovation:  The
Implementation of New Inventions,"  Paper Prepared For: Technology and Transition  in the USSR,  A
NATO  Science Policy Workshop,  University  of Birminghaml7-20  September,  1991.  This  article
shows  that USSR innovational  speed  in both the  civilian and  defense  sectors lagged  significantly
behind that of the West.
-7-explicitly designed to  foster specialization  and minimize  communication  and interaction
between different  strata  since these command  and  control  functions  were the exclusive
prerogative  of the  central  planning  apparatus.  More  importantly,  this  organizational
structure  fostered  the  nearly  total  separation  between  the  supply of R&D,  which  was
carried out by the various research  institutes  on the basis of goverunent  funding which
was  supplied  irrespective  of demand  for  innovations,  and  the  R&D  demands  of  the
enterprise sector which were largely divorced from the supply of innovations generated in
the research  institutes.8 As one observer noted,  a discussion  about  applied R&D  in the
US or Japan "would be mostly about large companies  such as IBM or Mitsubishi Electric
and the small ones that have been highly innovative.  This is because most applied  R&D
in market  economies  (apart  from defense)  is company financed,  company  directed,  and
company performed... .In  the Soviet Union,  however,  enterprises  did not have  this role
but rather  they maintained  the  tradition  of passivity  with respect  to  R&D.  R&D  was
largely  supplied  to  the  enterprise  as a  free good."9 Not  surprisingly,  the  diffusion  of
innovations  was  a weak point of Soviet R&D.  Even if Russian scientists  developed  an
innovation, Russian enterprises were generally slow to utilize the results of that scientific
activity.
Soviet R&D was divided into four distinct sectors, or silos:'I
*  The Academy Sector.  The Academy of Sciences,  created originally by Peter the
Great, and  related branch  academies  specialized  in basic research and was  at the
pinnacle  --  in terms  of prestige,  funding,  and manpower  skills  --  of the  Soviet
R&D system.  In 1990,  the 535  institutes of the Academy of Sciences accounted
for approximately  10% of the total research  and two thirds of the basic research
conducted in the USSR.
*  Higher Education Sector.  This  sector  was  primarily  responsible  for  training
scientists,  engineers,  and  researchers.  Except  for  a  small  number  of elite
universities and engineering  schools, the higher education sector was not expected
to be a center of R&D.  During the latter half of the 1980s, universities received
10% of the budget  funds allocated  to R&D, but they employed  1/3  of the  R&D
specialists  and almost 50% of the highly skilled personnel.  Because they received
less  funding  but  had  more  personnel,  universities  began  engaging  in  contract
research  with  enterprises  as  well  as  with  academic  and  industrial  institutes  in
order  to  supplement  their  funding.  Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  1992,  450
8  By comparison,  the US, as well as other  OECD countries, have  gone to great lengths to discourage
compartmentalization  and encourage  closer links between  industry,  universities  and  laboratories  in
the pursuit of basic and applied research.  For details, see the discussion in Section IV, below.
9  Leonid Gokhberg,  Merton J. Peck and Janos Gacs,  "Introduction,"  in L. Gokhberg, M. Peck and J.
Gacs,  Russian  Applied  Research  and  Development:  Its  Problemsn  and  Promise,  (International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis: Laxenberg,  Austria,  1997), p. 3.
10  For a description of the  Soviet S&T institutional  structural  see, Leonid Gokhberg,  "Transformation
of the Soviet  R&D  System,"  and  Viacheslav  Alimpiev  and Alexander  Sokolov,  "The Institutional
Structure of Applied R&D," both in Gokhberg, Peck and Gacs, op cit.
- 8 -educational  institutions  were engaged in some kind of R&D.  However,  in terms
of absolute  spending  on  research,  educational  institutions  remained  relatively
small,  accounting  for approximately  6%  of all R&D  spending  in  Russia.  The
financing  situation  for  these  institutions  remained  disastrous  as  both  budget
financing and contract research withered during the onset of the transition.
*  Industrial R&D Sector.  This  sector  was  engaged  primarily  in  applied  R&D.
During  the  Soviet period,  each branch ministry  organized  its own branch  R&D
institute  which  served  the branch  as  a whole  rather  than  specific  enterprises.'1
Decisions  about what research to perform  were taken  by the branch ministry as
part  of the  central  planning  system.  This  organizational  structure  tended  to
promote  specialization  which  hampered  the  diffusion  of  technology  across
sectors.  Moreover, because branch institutes had a monopoly on applied research
in  their  specific  sector,  the quality  of their output  was  generally  below  world
standards. Nevertheless, if they wanted to innovate, enterprises had no choice but
to  get  their  research  from  the  corresponding  branch  institute.  But  since
enterprises  were  under no  obligation  to  innovate,  they frequently  did not utilize
the  output  generated  by the  branch institutes.  The end  result,  therefore,  was  a
complete divorce between the supply of sectoral research and the demand  for this
research.  In  1990, the  industrial R&D  sector accounted  for 75%  of the applied
research,  88% of the development  research, and 78% of total research  conducted
in Russia that year.
e  Enterprise Sector.  Institutes  in this  sector were  attached  to  specific  enterprises
and were mainly  engaged in adapting R&D  supplied by other R&D  institutes  to
the  specific production  requirements  of that enterprise.  Financing  for this  work
was supplied by the enterprise, rather than the federal budget. Although this sector
of the R&D establishment had the closest  link to production, it was also the least
developed sector, accounting for approximately 5% of  total R&D spending.
In addition to bureaucratic  stratification,  the Soviet R&D system was characterized  by a
large  degree  of  geographical  segregation.  More  than  50  closed  science  cities,  or
naukogorodoks, were  established  during  the  Soviet period.  For security reasons,  many
were  deliberately  located  in  isolated  areas  or in  gated,  secure  compounds  adjacent  to
civilian  cities.  These  cities  generally  contained  one or two  specialized  enterprises  and
related  research  institutes.  Again,  by  explicit  design,  there  was  almost  no  linkage
between the output of these science cities and the R&D needs of industrial  enterprises in
the  surrounding  civilian  cities.  Funding  for these  science  cities  was  supplied  almost
entirely  from the budget, rather than from any commercial  sources.  Consequently,  their
work  had very little  commercial  orientation.  When budget  funding  dried up,  many of
these  cities  and  their science  intensive  town-forming  enterprises  were no  longer  viable
going concerns.12 Nevertheless, they continued to contain high concentrations of some of
Russia's best S&T assets.
11  During the 1970s, there were approximately 70 branch ministries.
12  For  a  description  of  economic  conditions  in the  closed  science  cities,  see  OECD,  Science,
Technologv and Innovation Policies. Federation of Russia.  Volume I. Evaluation Report  (Centre  for
-9-B.  Transition and Decay  - Change Without Transition
The USSR/Russian S&T system changed significantly since the collapse of the FSU.  But
while the changes have been profound, they have not produced a successful transition to
a market  based S&T system,  nor have they generated  a successful  partnership  between
science  and  industry,  one that  can serve  as  a resource to  support  a dynamic  innovative
economy.  As one recent report noted, "The achievements  of Russian  S&T.. .contributed
to the perception that, once freed from the rigidities of central planning,  it would provide
the basis  for  high technology  exports and  economic  growth."  3  Unfortunately,  that has
proven not to be the case.
A  1994 OECD evaluation of the Russian  S&T sector talked  candidly about the need to
downsize  what  the  report  termed  an  "oversized,  ill-adapted  system  in  rapid
deterioration."14 Downsizing  has  occurred  but  not  as  part  of a  long  term  strategy  to
revive  and  revitalize  the  core of a smaller  but more  economically  dynamic  and robust
sector.  Rather downsizing  has been mostly by default as  opposed to by design.  It has
been  inefficient  and unplanned,  a policy of survival of the unfit  as  those with  the best
skills  leave and those with weaker skills  remain behind.  As  a result,  Russian science,
which in the words of the OECD evaluation,  was "one of the greatest creations  and most
valuable possessions of civilization,"  is eroding rapidly, to the point where its long term
survival is in doubt.'5
Co-Operation  with  the  Economies  in Transition:  Paris),  1994  and  K.  Gonchar,  op.  cit., p.  42-47.
Recent reports  suggest  that  scientists  and  entrepreneurs  in  these  cities  may be  developing  a  more
commercial orientation.  See for example,  Stefan Wagstyl, "Research  In Russia:  The Campus Town
Housing The Country's Scientific Institutes  Is Adapting  To The Market Economy,"  Financial Times,
May 8, 2001.
13  Russia:  A  Science  and Technology  Profile,  ibid., p.  31.  This  sentimnent  was  echoed  by a recent
govermnent  report  which  declared,  "The  gap  between  the  large  number  of patents  awarded  to
Russian  citizens and the low level  of technology  employed  in production  can be explained by the
unfavorable  innovation climate and the absence of a single nation-wide innovation  system capable of
connecting  the national  scientific  potential  and  the  direct  results  of its activity  with the  market."
"Role  of the  State  in  Creating  a  Favorable  Innovation  Climate  in  Russia,"  Background  Report
Prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  Science  and  Technology  for  the  Helsinki  Seminar  on
Innovation  Policy  and  the  Valorisation  of Science  and  Technology  in  Russia,  March  1-2,  2001,
Paragraph 88.
14  According  to the  OECD, "the expansion of S&T institutions  tended  to be driven not by economic
considerations but by the value attached to technological prestige and by the bureaucratic  interests of
state  administrative  hierarchies.  Once  established,  R&D  organizations  grew inexorably,  following
the pattem of extensive  growth typical of the whole  economy.  There is no doubt that, in relation to
the scale of the economy and its real level of development, Russia now has an excessively large S&T
sector."  See  OECD, Science.  Technology and Innovation Policies, Federation of Russia.  Volume I.
Evaluation ReBorto  (Centre  for Co-Operation  with the Economies  in Transition: Paris),  1994, p.  16.
5  During  a  recent  interview,  Boris  Saltykov,  the  former Minister  of Science,  was  asked  whether
Russian  science was already clinically dead or merely on life support systems.  See,  Boris Saltykov,
"Is Russian Science a Cherry Orchard," Nezavissimaya Gazeta, February  16, 2001, p. 8.
- 10-This phenomenon  of change  without transition  is manifested  in both the  supply of and
demand  for  science in  the  Russian  economy.  It  can  be seen,  for  example,  in  (i)  the
patterns of S&T spending,  (ii) the evolving structure of the S&T labor force,  and (iii) the
evolving structure of R&D institutions (the supply side of the equation) as well as in (iv)
the demand for scientific output by Russian enterprises.
(i  S&T  Spending.  R&D  spending  from  all  sources  as a  share of GDP decreased  from
2.03%  in  1990  to 0.93%  in  1998  before rising slightly to  1.06%  in  1999.  It is now far
below the OECD average of 2.4%.  It is important to keep in mind that GDP was falling
during most of this period,  so in absolute terms  the decline  was  even more significant.
For example, in constant  1991 prices,  federal government  budget appropriations on S&T
declined from RUR 25 million in 1991  to RUJR 4.56 million in 1999, a decline of nearly
80%  in real terms.16 In view of the fact that only a portion of appropriations resulted in
actual  expenditures,  the  published  appropriations  data  may  actually  underestimate  the
severity of the decline.
As a result, Russian S&T spending on a per capita basis is far below the levels observed
in most OECD countries.  According to the Government's  economic  reform program, "In
1998 domestic  spending per capita on R&D in Russia was  $61,  compared with $794.40
in the United States,  $715  in Japan, and $510.60 in Germany.  Consequently, by 1999  in
terms  of spending  on  science  Russia  found  itself in  a  group  of countries  with  little
scientific potential (Hungary, Greece, Portugal and Poland)."''7 Russia's relative  situation
is even worse when measured in terms of government spending per scientist.  In 1996,  for
example,  total R&D spending per scientist amounted to $189,000  in the US, $148,000 in
Japan, $177,000 in France,  approximately  $150,000 in Germany  and the UK, and $5000
at  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences,  the  pinnacle  of  the  Russian  scientific
establishment.'8
At the  same  time that the  quantity of spending  has declined,  the  source  and  quality of
spending  has  not  adapted  to  the  requirements  of a  market  economy.  In  1999,  for
example,  the  Russian  government  was  still  financing  54%  of  R&D  expenditures
(compared  to  an  OECD  average  for government  R&D  financing  of 35%) and Russian
industry  was  financing  35%  of total  R&D outlays  (compared  to an  OECD  average  of
62%).'
16  S&T at a Glance.  2000.  Center  for Science  Research  and  Statistics,  Ministry of Industry,  Science
and Technology, Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3.
7  For  details  see,  Development  Strategy  of the  Russian  Federation  Until 2016,  Chapter  3.3,  "The
Innovation-Based Development of the Economy,"  Moscow,  2000.
18  Quoted in Natalia Zolotykh et. al., Creation Of Legal, Organizational And Economic Conditions For
Innovation  Activity  As  A  Factor  Of  Activation  Of Effective  Modernization  Of  Branches  Of
Industry,  Report  On  The  "Analysis  Of The  Status  Of The  Innovation  System  Of The  Russian
Federation" Prepared Under Contract N ERB IC15-CT98-1002,  stage N 1, 1999, p. 89.
'9  International  grants accounted for the remaining portion of Russian R&D funding.  All data are from
Daniel Malkin,  "Science  and Technology  in Russia:  Trends  and Policy Challenges,"  unpublished
OECD manuscript, 2001.  Malkin asserts that the reported share of business R&D spending in RussiaAs  recently  as  2000,  approximately  70%  of  government  financing  was  defined  as
institutional  funding of R&D institutions;  in other words,  subsidies  frequently  provided
on  a per capital  employment  basis  designed to  maintain  staff,  facilities  and equipment.
Only 22%  of government financing was allocated  to support what the government itself
defined  as  its  priority  objectives  and  a  paltry  8%  was  distributed  on  the  basis  of
competitive selection procedures.20  Not only was this spending inefficient in the sense
that most of it was  an untargeted  subsidy (which the government could ill afford), but it
actually  hampered  restructuring.  It  gave  institute  managers  an  incentive  to  stay  in
business and maintain excess employment in the hope of obtaining a larger subsidy.  And
it diverted government resources from more productive uses within the S&T sector.
(ii) S&T Labor Force.  The evolution of the S&T labor force is another clear example of
change  without  substantial  reform.  As  the  OECD  recommended,  the  sector  has
downsized but, contrary to OECD recommendations, in ways that did not leave it smaller,
stronger  and economically  more viable.  For example,  the number  of R&D specialists  in
Russia declined  from  1.9 million in  1990 to  872,000 in  1999,  a decline of 54%. Of this
total,  nearly  75%  still  work  in  federally  owned  institutions  and  only  5%  work  for
privately-owned  enterprises or institutions.-'
However,  despite  the  decline,  the  average  age  of  R&D  workers  has  increased
dramatically,  due primarily to the failure to recruit younger workers.  Today fewer than 8
percent of higher school graduates are choosing scientific  careers.  At the same time, the
share of researchers aged 50 and over exceeds  35% and the share of scientists in the most
productive age group (30 to 40 years of age) has plummeted.  Consequently,  the sector is
in danger of disappearing, rather than transiting to a smaller, more sustainable  basis.
The low pay received by R&D workers  is  a key  factor behind these unfavorable  labor
force trends.  The average pay for researchers in the S&T sector was only $65 per month
in  1999,  in  large  part  reflecting  the  sharp  decline  in  government  spending  for  R&D
coupled with a failure to  find alternative,  commercial  sources of support.  This led one
government  report to declare,  "despite  the low level of earnings in  science,  Russia has
is  a  "statistical  illusion"  and  that  the  real  business  share  is  actually  much  lower  and  the  real
government share  correspondingly higher.
20  Spending  data are  from Russian  Science  and Technology  at a Glance,  Figure 4.6.  In his April 3,
2001  address  to  the  nation,  President  Putin  recognized  the  need  to  change  the  government's
approach to science  funding,  declaring,  "today it  is necessary to define  clearly the priorities of the
state financing  of scientific activity  and at the same time  change the mechanism of its financing,  in
the way - amongst others - that our domestic scientific  foundations have doing for several years now.
Their approach is  to finance on competitive  grounds  specific  research projects rather  than research
organizations."
21  Russian Science and Technology at a Glance, 2000, Figure 3.7.  This data would appear to contradict
statistics in Figure 3.6 of the  same publication which indicate that just over 60% of R&D personnel
are employed in the business  enterprise sector.  The apparent  contradiction is caused by the fact that
many  research  personnel  are  emnployed  in  100%  government-owned,  corporatized  research
institutions.
- 12-managed to retain an impressive scientific potential. Driven by inertia, the continuation of
many research projects  has been motivated by purely scientific  interest.  This, however,
cannot last long.  The researchers  admitting of this kind of motivation are aging and will
soon be compelled  to retire.  There  is actually  no one  to  replace  them: younger people
cannot be satisfied with the level of income that can be earned in science today."22
These unfavorable labor market trends have given rise to fears that Russia is experiencing
three simultaneous types of brain drain.  The first is an internal brain drain as well trained
scientists leave the sector for better paid employment elsewhere  in Russia,  as taxi drivers,
bankers, businessmen, etc.  The second is an external brain drain as skilled workers leave
Russia  for employment  abroad as  scientific  workers.23 And  finally,  a technology  drain
coupled  with  "techno-nationalism."  Simply  stated,  the  perception  in  Russia  is  that
western  programs  ostensibly  designed  to  find  civilian  work  for  Russian  scientists
formerly employed  in the design  and production of "weapons  of mass  destruction"  are
thinly  disguised  attempts  by Western  firms  and  governments  to  get  cheap  access  to
Russian inventions and know how and to identify the most promising scientists  who will
be encouraged  to  emigrate or  stay in Russia and work  for  foreign  firms.  Either  way,
Western firms get Russian technology and know how for a comparative  pittance.
At  the  same  time,  a  spirit of "techno-nationalism"  is  giving  rise  to  fears  that western
sponsored  venture capital  funds  (TUSRIF,  EBRD Regional  Venture  Capital  funds)  shy
away from financing domestic high tech projects that may compete with Western firms.
As GORs report for the Helsinki conference  explained when discussing EBRD-supported
Regional  Venture  Funds  (RVFs),  "RVF  head-managers  are  very  reluctant  to  consider
high tech projects,  including for reasons  having to  do with what can  be called "techno-
nationalism,"  i.e.,  out  of fear  (often  well-grounded)  that  a  high-tech  project  amply
financed by a RVF may be a strong challenge to Western industrial leaders controlling  a
particular regional market.  This kind of fear is all the more relevant  since most projects
in the "traditional"  industries  (food industry,  etc.)  are  oriented toward domestic  market
demand first and foremost, whereas high-tech projects are the most efficient in the event
that their products are sold internationally."24
22  "Role  of the  State  in  Creating  a  Favorable  Innovation  Climate  in  Russia,"  Background  Report
Prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  Science  and  Technology  for  the  Helsinki  Seminar  on
Innovation  Policy  and  the  Valorisation  of Science  and  Technology  in  Russia,  March  1-2,  2001,
Paragraph  87.
23  From another perspective,  this external  brain drain could also be seen  as the creation of a Russian
diaspora  community.  If  properly  harnessed,  this  community  could  become  a  resource  for
development, providing capital, fostering partnerships,  etc. between high-tech firms in Israel,  Silicon
Valley  and  Russia.  There  is  fragmentary  anecdotal  evidence  to  suggest  that this reverse  flow  is
already taking place.  For example, one  speaker at the Helsinki seminar  was the former director of
one of the USSR's scientific research institutes in Kiev.  He left Ukraine  10 years ago to take a job
with a major multinational firm.  In that new capacity he managed to direct some low level research
contracts to his former colleagues  in Kiev, enough to keep the institute alive, if not exactly thriving.
He has  since  started  his  own  start-up  research  firm  with  German  financial  backing  and  is  now
directing a much larger volume of high skilled research contracts to his former institute.
24  "Role of the State in Creating  a Favorable Innovation Climate  in Russia,"  op.  cit.. Paragraph  32.  For
similar  sentiments,  also  see  "State  Policy  Concept  of the  Russian  Federation  in  the  Area  of
International  Science  and  Technology  Cooperation,"  Moscow  2000.  Section  3.6  of the  Concept
- 13 -(iii)  Structure  of R&D  Institutions.  Between  1990  and  1999,  the  number  of R&D
institutions declined by 12%, from 4646 in 1990 to 4089 in  1999.  However,  the number
of research institutes (primarily those belonging to the Russian Academy of Sciences and
those  formerly  controlled  by branch  ministries)  increased  by  50%  during  this  period
while the number of institutions in the higher education and enterprise  sector declined by
nearly 30%.  Consequently, in  1999 research  (2603) and  design organizations  (360)  still
outnumber higher education (387) and industrial enterprise  R&D institutes  (289).25  The
main  R&D  institutions  in  developed  market  economies  tend to  be  associated  with the
higher education  and enterprise  sector  -- the  two R&D  sectors with the closest links to
industry.  In Russia, by comparison, the overwhelming portion of R&D is still carried out
in those R&D institutions  that are farthest  removed  from the needs  and demands  of the
enterprise sector.  As one observer noted, "Two factors - the weak innovation capabilities
of  Russian  industrial  enterprises  [which  will  be  discussed  below]  and  the  relative
isolation  of the branch  research institutes  from industrial  enterprises  - have a negative
impact  on  competitiveness  and  the  design,  manufacture  and  marketing  of products  in
Russia.  Indeed,  these  two  factors  could  therefore  be  said  to  be  the  most  significant
obstacles  to  the  transformation  of the  Russian  R&D  system  into  the  desired  Russian
system of  innovation."26
(iv)  Demand  for S&T.  At the onset of the  transition process,  the  expectation  was  that
private  enterprises  would  finance  the  bulk  of the  S&T  spending,  much  as  they  do in
market economies  elsewhere.  As private enterprises increased their demand and funding
for innovation by contracting with institutes and conducting their own in-house  research,
they  would  establish  priorities  and  set  the  research  agenda.  The  government  would
recede into the background  and play a less dominant role - certainly in comparison  to its
role during Soviet times.
This  proved  to  be  a  premature  expectation,  at  best.  Government  funding  decreased
substantially,  but private demand  for R&D has not picked up the slack.  As  a result,  the
government  is  still  the  dominant  source  of funding  for R&D,  albeit  at  a  much  lower
absolute  level than before.  The choice,  as one observer noted, "was government funding
Paper declares,  "To ensure the technological  safety of the country, it is necessary to set up a system
of state  accounting  and  control  of technology  transfer  for  civil  applications,  the  development  of
which  involved  federal  budget  funds.  The  main  attention  here  should  be  devoted  to  issues  of
protection  (including  legal  action)  of intellectual  property  from  leaking  or  being  illegally  used
abroad. To  ensure technological  security  it is necessary  to exercise  strict  state control  over foreign
support for Russian scientists and organizations  which used to work in the area of defense  in Russia
in  their  transition  to  the  development  and  manufacture  of science  intensive  products  for  civil
applications.
25  Data are from L. Gokhberg, N. Kovaleva, and I.  Kouznetsova,  Innovation  Management  in Russia:  A
Review of Training Needs and Qpportunities  for Growth, The British Council,  2001, p. 6.
26  Ibid., p.  7.  The authors  go  on  to state,  "A  major  factor discouraging  economic  growth  through
innovation  are the barriers  that exist between those conducting research  and development  and those
in industry.  The  institutional  and organizational  principles  of the  ex-Soviet R&D  system created
such barriers,  emphasizing research but giving less attention to other aspects of innovation."
- 14-or none  at  all."27 And with continued government  funding  came continued  government
dominance over R&D priorities.
In retrospect,  the private sector's failure to increase its demand for R&D  and innovation
is  not  surprising,  given  the  overall  economic  downturn  following  the  onset  of the
transition  process.  In  the  context  of  the  struggle  for  survival,  innovation,  like
maintenance, became a luxury that could easily be postponed, at least for a while.
In  1998, only 6% of all surveyed Russian enterprises  engaged in any form of innovative
activity.  By comparison,  one-third  of US companies  were reported to be "innovationally
active."28 Of those  Russian  firms  which  did  innovate,  only  18%  of their  innovation
expenditures  were  related  to  the  development  of new  products,  services,  and  new
production  processes.  The  comparable  figure  for  OECD  firms  exceeded  33%.  In
addition,  survey  data  suggests  that  most  innovationally  active  Russian  firms  are  not
trying to  enter  foreign  markets.  Their  goals are  less  lofty.  They  are  simply trying  to
preserve  their  existing  share of the  Russian  and  CIS  markets.  As  a  result,  innovation
spending by Russian firms has a low R&D content (marketing, packaging, etc.) which, in
turn,  leads  to  a  low  demand  for  science  and  technology  outputs.  "Most  of Russia's
enterprises  are too  inert....Russian  businesses  never  rush  to catch up  on  sophisticated
foreign technology."29
Survey  data  suggests  that  a  larger  percentage  of  SMEs  are  inclined  to  be  more
innovatively active compared with larger firms and that their innovation activities tend to
display a much greater R&D intensity.  However,  there are  still too  few SMEs  to have
any  noticeable  impact  on  the  aggregate  demand  for  S&T.  Moreover,  the
business/innovation  infrastructure  - tax,  capital  and  financial  markets,  administrative
barriers -inhibits the emergence  of a vibrant  SME sector.  Consequently,  SMEs are still
not in a position to be the engine of innovation that they are in OECD  countries.  Large
enterprises,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  have  a  more  stable  financial  position  and
diversified  source of revenues.  They have the financial  means to  innovate  and  account
for  the  majority  of innovation  activity  actually  currently  taking  place  in  the  Russian
economy.  Not  surprisingly,  more  than  two-thirds  of  innovation  expenditures  are
27  Leonid  Gokhberg,  Merton J. Peck and Janos  Gacs,  op  cit,  "Introduction,"  Chapter  1, p.  4.  The
Helsinki paper notes, in Para 46 that the aggregate share of business sector R&D financing increased
from  15.5% in  1997 to  17.3% in 1998.  But the report goes on to caution that "these  figures should
not be interpreted  as a sign of the business community's  growing interest in R&D.  The  share of the
business sector's grew only because of the drastic decrease  in the share of government  spending in
the wake of the 1998  crisis."
28  All data  on  innovation  activity  are  from' Leonid  Gokhberg  and  Irina Kuznetsova,  Technological
Innovation in Russia. Centre for Science Research  and Statistics,  Moscow 1998  and Sergei Glaziev,
I'dar Karimov,  and Irna Kuznetsova,  "Innovation  Activity of Russian  Industrial  Enterprises,"  in
Gokhberg, Peck and Gacs, op. cit.
29  "Role  of the  State  in  Creating  a  Favorable  Innovation  Climate  in  Russia,"  Background  Report
Prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  Science  and  Technology  for  the  Helsinki  Seminar  on
Innovation  Policy  and  the  Valorisation  of Science  and Technology  in Russia,  March  1-2,  2001,
Paragraph  18.
-15 concentrated  in  two  sectors  - chemicals  and  chemical  products  and  machinery  and
equipment.  At least  in Russia today,  these sectors  are dominated by large  firms rather
than SMEs.
C.  GOR's Response:  The Innovation Based Development of the Economy
Reversing  the  decay  of the  S&T  sector  has  now  become  a  government  priority.  As
articulated  in  statements  by President  Putin30 and  the  Government's  economic  reform
program, the government's  objective  is to ensure that Russia's S&T prowess becomes  a
resource  for economic  growth and industrial  revitalization  so that Russia can transform
itself from  a  "colonial"  economy,  dominated  by  raw  material  exports,  to  a  high  tech,
science intensive development stage based on the achievements  of domestic S&T. As the
Government's  reform  program  declares,  "The  creation  of  favorable  conditions  for
innovation  will make  it  possible  to  modernize  the  technological  base  of the  Russian
economy and fundamentally improve the competitiveness  of domestic products." 31
The Government's  economic reform  program outlines  a three  stage program to achieve
32  -02  st these  objectives.  The  objective  of  the  first  stage,  lasting  from  2000-2002,  is  to
30  Vladimir  Putin,  "Russia At  the Turn of the New Millenniumn,"  January  4, 2000.  In that statement,
President Putin observes,  "The quick progress  of science,  technologies,  and advanced  economy  is
underway  in only a small number of states.. .The lack of capital investments and insufficient attitude
to innovations resulted in a dramatic fall in the production of [Russian]  commodities  that are world
competitive  in terms of price-quality ratio.  Foreign rivals have pushed Russia especially  far back on
the  market  of science-intensive  civilian  products.  Russia  accounts  for  less  than  1%  of  such
commodities  on the world market,  while the USA provides 36% and Japan 30%."
31  Development  Strategy  of the  Russian Federation  Until  2010,  Chapter  3.3,  "The  Innovation-Based
Development of the Economy," Moscow,  2000.  These sentiments are repeated in the 2001  update  of
the Government  program.  For example,  the draft  chapter entitled  "Reforming  the  Science  Sector:
Areas  and  Key  Measures,"  declares,  "The  key  objective  of  the  state  long-term  science  and
technology  and  innovation  policies  is  setting priorities  for the  development of the  science and
technology and innovation sectors, which have an impact on the production  efficiency upgrade  and
improvement of the competitive power of products." Except where explicitly noted, all quotes in the
remainder of this section are from The Innovation Based Development.
32  The background paper which the Ministry of Industry,  Science and Technology (MIST)  prepared for
the Helsinki Seminar also outlines  a slightly different three stage development program.  According
to the  MIST program,  the Russian  economy  will pass through  a resource  (colonial)  stage  and  an
investment  stage  before  finally  reaching  the  innovation-based  stage  of development.  During  the
colonial stage, raw material  exports are used to generate  an economic  surplus  which  is invested  in
new  industrial  equipment  during  the investment  stage.  Foreign  investment  is  a major  source  of
innovation  and  technology  for  Russian  industry.  During  the  investrnent  stage,  the  state  will
emphasize  the  establishment  of a  favorable  business  climate  and business  will  "learn to organise
internal  co-operation  at their  enterprises,  establish  efficient  ties  with research  centres,  consulting
firms,  consumers  and  suppliers,  promote  co-operation  with  other  companies  in  search  of new
business  and  investment  opportunities,  and  upgrade  the  educational  level  of  their  personnel."
During  the  innovation  stage,  the  demand  for  innovation  switches  from  foreign  sources  to
domestically produced  innovation.  A related three stage  model of Russian economic  development
can  be  found  in  A.  Svinarenko,  Y.  Kuzminov,  B.  Kuznetsov,  et.  al.,  The  Main  Directions  For
Structural Policv And Sector Markets Regulation,  Higher School  of Economics,  Moscow  2000 and
- 16 -"maintain  the  technological  base of those industries  with a stable  demand  on domestic
and  world  markets."  During  this  stage,  innovations  will  be  oriented  toward  the
modernization  of  existing  production  facilities  based  on  resource  conserving
technologies.  The resources  to finance these investments will be derived primarily from
retained  eamings  and  depreciation  allowances.  State  financial  support  should  be
supplementary and provided on a "repayable basis."
During the second stage (from 2003-2007), Russian enterprises will "employ state-of-the-
art"  technologies  and  enter  domestic  and  foreign  markets  with  world  class  research
intensive  products,"  eventually  gaining  market  share  in  "sectors  where  domestic
producers  have  not  been  represented."  Progress  in  this  area  will  require  shifting
economic priorities and emphasis away from resource  extraction and towards investment
in value  added,  high tech  manufacturing.  "The  defining  reference  point  in  economic
policy should be to increase the percentage of products of the processing industries both
on the  domestic  market  and  in exports;  to  build up the  percentage  of high-technology
products;  and  to  move from primarily  price-based  competition relying  on low  costs to
competition  based  on improvement  of the  attractiveness  of production  to  consumers."
Financing for this stage will  come,  "first and foremost  from the  raw  material  sector as
well as  from the sale of military equipment.  All the levers of government  management
need to be brought into play in order to bring the short term benefits to investors that are
derived  from  the  sale  of raw  materials  and  semi-manufactures  into  accord  with  the
national  objectives  of  long  term,  highly  profitable  and  stable  growth  along  the
innovation-based  track  of economic  development."  In  addition,  private  finance  from
pension  funds, insurance companies  and credit unions will also be marshaled,  along with
foreign loans that will be repaid "through the export of commercial end products."
In the third, innovation based stage  of development (2007-2010),  the state will support
the  development  of  innovation  infrastructure.  As  a  result,  domestic  demand  for
innovation  will  increase  and  relations  between  research  and  production  will  be
strengthened.  Meanwhile, "the state's [emphasis  added] attention will tum to new forms
of  scientifically  innovative,  engineering  activities  that  utilize  the  latest  information
technologies.  The state's  attention  should  gradually shift  from  the  quantitative  to  the
qualitative  aspects of support."  At the  same  time, the  private  sector  will  develop  and
support  efficient  specialized  scientific  and  technological  enterprises  and  assume
responsibility for training personnel and developing technologies.
In terms of the  specific  measures  to  launch  Russia on this  three  stage path,  the report
highlights  various  "practical  measures"  that  should  be  implemented  in the  sphere  of
science  policy  and  commercialization  policy.  In  the  area  of  science,  the  report
recommends  such policies  (listed  in  the order  they are  presented  in  the report)  as  (i)
increasing  funding  for  fundamental  research  and  other  high  priority  state  science
programs; (ii)  increasing the percentage of government funds allocated  on a competitive
grant  basis;  (iii)  employing  "parity  and  repayable"  funding  mechanisms  to  support
commercially  significant  R&D  projects;  (iv)  inventorying  the  existing  [stock  of state-
also  in  Y.Kuzmninov  and  A.Yakovlev,  Economic  Modernization:  Global  Tendencies,  Main
Constraints And Strategv Options, Higher School of Economics,  Moscow, 2000.
- 17-funded]  research  that has potential  for further development  and "provid[ing]  incentives
for the mutual exchange of technologies between the defense  and civilian sectors" and (v)
deepening the integration of science and education.
With  respect  to  technology  commercialization,  the  paper  recommends  such  principal
measures as: (i) developing a system of extra-budgetary  venture investing and funding for
high risk  projects.  "State  support  for the  venture  business  is  necessary  until  industry
shows  interest  in  it."  (ii)  developing  a  system  of  state  and  private  insurance  for
innovation  risks;  (iii)  supporting  the  formation  within  financial  industrial  groups  of
insurance companies that would insure credit risks associated with the commercialization
of  innovative  products;  (iv)  developing  innovation-oriented  small  business  via  the
creation  favorable  conditions  and  infrastructure  (technology  innovation  centers,
incubators,  techno-parks,  etc.);  (v)  restoring  cooperative  relationships  between
educational,  research  and  industrial  organizations;  (vi)  developing  a  system  of extra-
budgetary funds to support R&D in the interest of various industries; and (vii) developing
and expanding a system for training management personnel.
Last but not least, the report stresses the importance of "drawing intellectual property into
economic circulation  and providing  dependable  protection against its unsanctioned use."
As  the  report  notes,  "Unless  they  are  put  into  economic  use,  items  of  intellectual
property, produce  no revenue,  steadily grow obsolete and  very quickly lose any realistic
potential for use....In the transition  to an innovation-based  economy,  special importance
attaches to questions of the protection  and use of intellectual  property as a special type of
intangible  product.  The formation  of a regulatory  space  for intellectual  property should
be completed in the country and the specific responsibility of government  agencies for it
should be defined in the near future."
Indeed,  as  a  sign of the importance  of intellectual  property issues in  the mind of GOR
officials,  three  of the  four  Priority  Measures  enumerated  in  the  Innovative  Economy
section of the Government's  Social Policy and Economic  Modernization  Action Plan for
2000-200133  involve  intellectual  property.  These  include  proposals  to  (i)  develop  key
policies  for involving in the economic  turnover the results of research  and development
created with the budgetary financing;  and to define measures  for their implementation;34
33  As approved by Govermnent Directive No.  1072-p,  dated July 26, 2000.
34  Simply stated,  this refers to the process of commercializing  inventions  that were financed,  in whole
or  in part,  with  funds  from the  USSR,  RFSR,  or Russian  Federation  budgets.  For  all  practical
purposes,  this  includes  almost  100%  of the  existing stock  of inventions  and  a large,  but smaller,
percentage  of the  current  flow.  As  one  report  noted  recently,  "Taking  into  account  that  the
overwhelming  majority  of  scientific-research,  experimental-design  and  technological  works  is
performed in Russia at the expense of federal  budget resources, the lack of clarity on the subject of
ownership, use  and disposal of the results  obtained in the course of these works is one of the most
serious  factors,  restraining  innovation  activity."  Cited  in  Creation  of Legal.  Organizational  and
Economic  Conditions  for Innovation  Activity as  a Factor of Activation of Effective Modernization
of Branches  of  Industry:  Analysis  Of The  Status  Of The  Innovation  System  Of The  Russian
Federation,  Report prepared under Contract  N ERB IC15-CT98-1002,  stage N 1, May,  1999, by the
International  Institute of Applied  Technology,  Transtechnology,  ANVAR  Innovation  Agency,  and
Moscow State Aviation Technology University, P. 45.
- 18-(ii) improve the legal and regulatory  framework  governing  the protection of intellectual
property rights and other results of intellectual  activity; and (iii) develop a procedure  for
making an inventory and valuation of the intellectual property objects.
m.  Intellectual Property (IP)35 - Much Ado About Nothing?
Why are IP issues important?  Unknown or unclear ownership creates  uncertainty which
acts as a deterrent to investment.  No rational individual would purchase a house without
obtaining clear  title and  no rational  investor  would invest in  agricultural  improvements
without clear title to the land.  The situation with IP is analogous.  It is an intangible asset
whose rights of ownership and use need to be clarified if commercialization  is to occur. 36
These  concerns  have  provoked  an  active  debate  in Russia  about  the  ownership  of IP
"created  at the expense  of budget  resources."  On  the one hand,  this is a  fundamental
debate  since,  as  noted  above,  it  is  impossible  to  commercialize  something  if the
ownership  is unclear or uncertain.  But while clarifying ownership is necessary,  it is not
sufficient.  Clear titling is only a means to  an end.  The ultimate  objective  is not clear
titling per se but rather the creation  of an efficient  system of industrial  innovation  and
technology  commercialization  based  on the  efficient  transfer  and  dissemination  of IP
"from the lab to the market."  This section will outline the major contours of the existing
Russian IP legislation and ongoing debate related to budget funded IP.7  The discussion
of IP legislation focuses on three distinct periods and sets of issues:
35  From  a  legal  perspective,  intellectual  property  covers  a  number  of related  but  distinct  issues,
including:  (i) Patents;  (ii)  Industrial  Designs;  (iii)  Utility Models;  (iv)  Trade  Marks  and  Service
Marks;  (v)  Appellation  of  Origin  of  Goods;  (vi)  Computer  Programs  and  Data  Bases;  (vii)
Topologies and Integrated Micro Circuits; (viii) Achievements  in Selection;  and (ix) Copyrights and
Allied Rights.  Except as noted explicitly in the text (for example in An 1 discussing WTO and anit-
piracy issues),  the phrase  IP as  used in this paper  connotes  ownership  of inventions  and generally
refers to the legal protection codified in the Patent Law of the Russian Federation.
36  Pratt  and Whitney (P&W)  is  reportedly  interested  in various  transactions  with high  tech air craft
manufacturing  enterprises  in  PermL  But  the  transactions  have  reportedly  been  delayed,  pending
resolution of the IP ownership issue.  Similarly, it has been reported that Tupelov entered into a joint
venture to produce  a new generation of airplanes.  In return for the use of "its" IP, the state took an
ownership stake in the JV. However,  the investments  required to commercialized Russia's potential
stock of IP will be hobbled until the state clarifies when it will demand an ownership  stake for use of
IP  created  with  budget  funds  and  what  precise  IP  objects  are  subject  to  this  state  ownership
provisions.
37  Many other aspects of IP, including piracy, WTO accession, and TRIPs are important features of the
Russian  IP  landscape.  However,  they  are  not  the dominant  focus  of the  Government  economic
reform program and,  therefore, of this paper.  Nevertheless,  Annex  I provides  a description of the
IP-WTO  issues,  including  the  improvements  in  the  IP protection  system  that  will  be required  to
ensure  compliance  with  WTO  practices.  It is  interesting  to  observe  the  almost  total  disconnect
between the  focus of the debate  in Russia  (who  owns  IP created  in  whole or in part  with budget
resources)  and  the  [P  issues  that are  uppermost  in  the  minds  of foreign  multinationals  (how  can
Microsoft, Sony, etc. protect their intellectual property from piracy in Russia).
- 19-(i) Pre-1992:  The pre-1992 period  and the Soviet Union approach to IP ownership.
This  time  frame  is  important  since  the  vast  majority  of budget  funded  IP  was
created  during  this  period.  To  a  large  extent,  the  debate  over the ownership  of
budget-funded  IP in the post-soviet period is an attempt to eliminate or correct the
ambiguities  created  when  Soviet  era  IP  legal  and  organizational  concepts  were
combined with a Western system of private property,  privatization and intellectual
property.
(ii)  1992-1998:  The  post-1992  period  characterized  by  the  adoption  of Russian
Federation  IP  legislation  covering  the  full  gamut  of  topics  from  patents  to
copyrights, trademarks, and microchip typologies.
(iii)  1998-Present:  The  period  from  1998  to  the  present  when  the  ownership  of
budget funded  LP seems to have become a major focus of discussion.
A.  Intellectual Property Laws In the Soviet Union
Patents,  or IP,  as  the  term  is commonly  used in Western  legal  systems,  is  the right  to
prevent someone from using an invention without the permission of the inventor or patent
holder, usually expressed  in the form of a license granted  in exchange  for royalties.38 It
does not grant the patent holder or licensee  the right to use the  invention.  For example,
someone  holding  a  patent  on  a  chemical  compound  can  prevent  someone  else  from
selling or using that compound.  But the patent holder or licensee cannot necessarily use
the compound,  say for pharmaceutical  purposes,  until the appropriate national regulatory
authorities authorize the sale and use of that compound.
In the Soviet Union, by comparison, inventions  were state property and, in theory,  freely
available  for  anyone  to  use  without  special  permission,  licenses  or royalty  payments,
provided that such usage was deemed to be in the interest of the state.39 Under the Soviet
system,  an inventor  received  public  recognition  in  the  form  of an Authors'  Certificate
(AC or avtorskoe svidetel 'stvo).  In addition to ego gratification  and patriotic recognition,
the inventor might expect to receive a small one time monetary bonus and, perhaps, some
special  privileges - a bigger apartment,  a longer  vacation,  employment,  promotion,  etc.
Under no circumstances,  however, did the AC grant the inventor the exclusive right to the
38  This  report does  not purport  to provide  a description  of basic  intellectual  property  concepts  and
legal practices.  For a layman's guide to these  issues, see  Jeffrey I. Auerbach,  "Patent Law Basics,"
November  1994,  available  at the  web  site of the Association  of University  Technology  Managers
http://www.autrnnet
39  This  discussion  draws  heavily  on Andrei  A.  Baev,  "Protection  of Intellectual  Property  Rights  in
Russia,  in  David  Bernstein  (ed.),  Cooperative  Business  Ventures  between  US  Companies  and
Russian  Defense  Enterprises,  Center  for  International  Security  and  Arms  Control,  Stanford
University,  1997.  Baev notes, for example,  "The Soviet ideology  that a discovery or creation was
made for the good of the whole people and thus owned by all of the people placed the overwhelning
bulk of intellectual products  into the 'public domain."'  Another excellent summary of the IP regime
during  the  Soviet  Period  is  available  in  Glenn  Schweitzer,  From  Swords  Into  Market  Shares:
Technologv. Economics  and Security in the New Russia. John Henry Press, 2000, Chapter 5.
- 20 -invention, including the right to charge others for the privilege of using the invention and
also provided the legal basis on which to file for patent protection.
Civilian  inventions  covered  by AC's were  thus  placed  in  the  public  domain.  Soviet
enterprises  had  the  right  to  use  these  inventions  at  their  discretion,  without  special
permission or licenses.  In addition,  the State, rather than the inventor, had the exclusive
right to  control  the  use  of these  inventions  outside  the USSR by  entering  into  license
agreements  or applying  for foreign patent protection.  One result of this system  is that
individual  scientists  rarely concerned themselves  with IP issues  filing patents,  issuing
licenses,  generating  royalties,  or even  seeing  to it that a particular invention  was used.
Everything  belonged  to  the  state,  which  handled  these  tasks  as  part  of the  overall
planning  function.  In  addition,  a  research  institute's  recognition  and  flow  of annual
budget  resources  was  not related  to  the use  of its  inventions  - i.e.,  how  many  were
utilized/commercialized  - but  rather,  by  how  many  inventions  were  created  and
registered via ACs.
Patents, however,  were theoretically  available under limited circumstances in the Soviet
Union.  As in other countries, Soviet patents granted the patent holder the exclusive right
to  license  the  use  of the  invention  and  to  collect  royalties.  However,  three  factors
discouraged the use of patents by ordinary Soviet scientists and inventors.40  First, unlike
AC's  which  were virtually  free,  Soviet  patents  were  costly to  apply for  and maintain.
Second, by opting to apply for a patent instead of an AC, an inventor could not be certain
that  the  patent  would  be  granted.  But  the  inventor  was  almost  certainly  forgoing  the
valuable  social benefits  accruing  to holders of AC's  and, possibly, exposing  himself to
retaliatory measures for prefening personal enrichment at the expense of the "good of the
whole  people."  And  finally,  Soviet  law  stipulated  that the  State  owned  all  inventions
created  (i)  in the  course  of an  inventor's  employment  at a  state  enterprise  or research
institute,  (ii) via the use of Vroperty  belonging to the state, or (iii) with budget resources
appropriated  by  the  State.  In  these  cases,  which  constitute  the  vast  majority  of
inventions created during the Soviet period, inventors were eligible only for AC's.
Melding the  Soviet Union's AC  system with  a modern  patent system has proven  to be
more difficult than expected.  As the next section will show, RF IP legislation,  adopted in
1992  and  1993,  is modern  and  up-to-date,  covering  most of the major  IP  issues  and
complying  with most  international  norms,  treaties,  and international  conventions.  The
difficulty, therefore, is not related to legal drafting per se.  Rather, it relates to sorting out
IP ownership issues in the midst of a rapid transition in ownership which raises a number
of complex questions that have yet to be resolved.
40  According  to  Baev,  p.  270,  most  Soviet  patents,  as  opposed  to ACs,  were  issued  to foreigners
seeking to protect products licensed or sold to Soviet entities.
41  The concept that the intellectual  property rights  to inventions  created in the course of emnployment
belong  to the employer rather than the employee  is fairly standard  in most  western  legal  systems.
For an interesting discussion  of various US court rulings on this subject,  see Stanley  H. Lieberson,
"Relevant Concepts  in Determining  Difficult Disputes Over Ownership," Journal of the Association
of University Technology Managers  Vol.  10, 1998.
- 21  -B.  Intellectual Property Legislation in the Russian Federation42
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation enacted a series of
laws  defining  and  protecting  various  forms of intellectual  property,  including  patents,
trade marks, and copyrights, among others.43  Experts  seem to agree that in all important
respects  Russian  IP  legislation  complies  with  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual
Property  Rights  (TRIPS)  requirements  for  entry  into  WTO.  As  one  observer  noted
recently,  "The soundness of the  1992/1993 legislation is reflected in the likely acceptance
of Russia  into  the  WTO.  Membership  requires  that national  legislation  on intellectual
property rights meets an international  standard of acceptability."A4
Pursuant to this legislation, ownership  rights to the results of government funded IP were
assigned to the institutions  where the work was conducted.  An important  feature of the
legislation  is  that ownership  rights  could  be  assigned  only to  legal  entities  - research
institutes,  manufacturing  enterprises,  and  innovative  firms,  etc.  - that  made  the
discoveries.  Ownership  rights  could  not be  assigned directly to  the ministries  that had
funded those activities or under whose  auspices the work had been conducted.
When  Russian  IP  legislation  was  adopted,  this  was  a  distinction  without  a  difference.
Russia  had  not  yet  embarked  on  its  privatization  program.  Consequently,  the  vast
majority  of  research  institutes,  manufacturing  enterprises  and  innovative  firms  that
received  IP rights were all state  owned.  Thus, irrespective of whether the IP rights were
delegated  to  a ministry  or to  an  enterprise  or  institute,  the  state  directly  or indirectly
remained the owner of budget funded  IP.
Privatization  changed  these  arrangements.  Suddenly,  it  appeared  that  the  rights  to
government  funded IP would  be assigned  to newly privatized,  entities  - a situation that
42  Excellent  summaries of the entire array of intellectual property legislation in the Russian Federation
including  patent  laws,  copyright  laws,  etc.  is  available  in  Improvement  Of  The  Policy  And
Regulatory  Framework  For  Small  And  Medium  EnterUrise  Development:  Part  D.  Patents  and
Intellectual Propertv Rights Development, A Report by KKP Partners, June 2000. Another  excellent,
comprehensive summary can be  found in Part I of Creation of Legal.  Organizational  and Economic
Conditions for Innovation Activity as a Factor of Activation of Effective Modernization  of Branches
of Industry:  Analysis  Of The Status Of The Innovation  System Of The Russian  Federation,  Report
prepared  under  Contract  N  ERB  IC15-CT98-1002,  stage  N  1,  May,  1999,  by  the  International
Institute of Applied  Technology, Transtechnology,  ANVAR  Innovation Agency, and Moscow  State
Aviation Technology University.
43  In  fact, the drive  to modernize  the intellectual property protection  began during the last months of
the  Soviet  Union  with  the  passage  of the  Civil  Code  of the  Soviet  Union,  the  USSR  Law  on
Inventions,  and other related legislation.  Many of these laws were in effect for only six months. For
details,  see Creation of Legal...,  p. 7-12.  A complete  list of the legal acts of the Russian Federation
(in  Russian  and  English)  in  the  field  of legal  protection  and  commercialization  of intellectual
property,  with  abstracts  and  complete  texts  can  be  found  in the  web  site  (funded  by  the  British
Council  and  the  Russian  Foundation  for  Assistance  to  Small  Innovative  Enterprises)
http://www.Jpr.inage.ru
44  Quoted  in  Schweitzer,  op.  cit.  P.  118.  See  1,  below,  for  a  more  detailed  discussion  of the
compliance of Russian  IP legislation with TRIPS requirements  as well as  for  a discussion of anti-
piracy issues in Russia.
- 22 -was  never  contemplated  when the  IP  laws  were  passed.45 This  led  one  observer  to
declare,  "The  consequence  has  been  the  spontaneous  redistribution  of rights  to  such
results, the  ineffective  use of research  results,  the development  of many undefined  and
contentious  relationships  and the  violation  of the  legal  rights  of patent  and  copyright
owners.  These  developments  highlight  the  need  to  examine  the entire  set  of issues
associated  with the creation,  legal  protection,  and introduction  into the economy of the
results  of  scientific-technical  activity  and  to  formulate  the  basic  position  of  the
government  on  the  questions  of intellectual  property arising  in the  scientific-technical
sphere."46
C.  The Status of Budeet-Funded IP
There is a widely shared view in Russia that the existing stock of government financed IP
is rapidly becoming obsolete before much of it can be commercialized.  Rather than  let
this  potentially  valuable  resource  go  to  waste,  the  Government  hopes  to  find ways  to
"introduce  the  results  of IP  into  the  economic  turnover."  While  there  is  a  strong
consensus about the importance of commercializing  this IP, there is less agreement about
either how to do it or who should do it.  Simultaneously,  there is a squabble over dividing
the spoils of commercialization.  Even before anything has been commercialized,  various
groups within the government and research  establishment  are debating who  should own
the  IP,  who  should  get  royalties  and  license  fees  from  successful  commercialization
efforts, and how to levy property taxes on any IP that is assigned to private enterprises.
While  these are all important questions,  the attention devoted  to these issues is diverting
attention  from  a  more  important  and  meaningful  policy  debate:  specifically,  what
government policies will most effectively support  commercialization  of both the existing
stock and new flow of IP.  And in addition, how can Russia's existing S&T assets -- both
IP,  human  resources,  universities,  research  institutes,  and  enterprises  --  support  the
restructuring and revival of Russia's economy.
The current debate is framed around the question of who should own IP that was financed
with budget resources.  Although the discussion does not always distinguish between the
two, this  includes  the  existing  stock of budget  financed  IP  as well as the new  flow of
budget  financed  IP.  To  recapitulate,  prior  to  1992/1993,  all  IP  belonged  to  the  state.
Russia's  patent  laws  and  related  IP  legislation  were  designed  before  the  full  scale
revolution  in property  rights  had  occurred.  Therefore,  when  the  legislation  assigned
ownership of a particular piece of IP to the institution that had created it, by implication,
45  Russian IP legislation was modeled after US  and European legislation.  Thus,  the legal  framework
implicitly assumed the existence  of a functioning market economy with well-defined, stable property
relations.  Neither the IP laws of Europe,  the US, or Russia  were designed to accommodate  such a
sudden, large scale shift in property relations.
46  Yuri  0.  Lebedev,  'Problems  of  Taxation  and  Technology  Commercialization  in  Russia,"
Technologv  Commercialization:  Russian  Challenges.  American  Lessons  (Washington,  D.C.:
National  Academy  Press,  1998),  p.  51.  For  a  similar  analysis,  see  Vladimir  Meshcheryakov,
"Development  of  Legal  Relations  for  Technology  Commercialization  in  Russia"  in  the  same
volume.
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state or one of its agencies.  Following the privatization,  process, however,  that was no
longer  the case.  This  revolution  in  property  relations  created  a legislative  void  in IP
ownership and raised a new question:  In a world characterized by private enterprise, who
should own the existing stock of budget financed IP that had been created in state-owned
institutions with the use of budget funds?
This  ongoing  discussion  is  complicated  by  several  additional  factors.  The  first  is the
widely shared view that Russia's natural resources  were privatized  too cheaply.  GOR is
determined  not to repeat  that mistake with IP.  This time  it wants to make  sure that the
government  is  fairly  compensated  for  its  assets.  The  second  is  the  perception  that  a
sizeable portion of the existing stock of budget-financed  IP is leaking out of the country.
The most valuable portions are now being commercialized  by foreign companies that hire
Russian scientists  in order to  gain access to their  "know how"  or that purchase Russian
high  tech  products  from Russian  enterprises  which  do  not  have  clear  title  to the  IP
embedded  in  these products.  In either event,  neither GOR nor anyone  else  in Russia is
receiving  license fees  or royalties for the use of this  IP.  Even worse, as long as  the  IP
ownership issue remains murky, it is not clear who should be entitled to claim title to the
royalties  or defend the IP ownership  rights against  this form of "piracy."47 The third is
the tendency on the part of some participants in the discussion to view the existing stock
of budget funded  IP as a valuable antique that has been lost and forgotten in a musty attic.
If it is "rediscovered"  and put on sale,  it can be a source of considerable revenue.  All that
is needed,  in this view,  is to take an inventory of the  existing  IP, assign ownership,  and
collect  royalties  for its use.  In the  case of military  and  dual  use technologies,  where
Soviet  technology  and  know-how  is  embedded  in  military  or  civilian  products  (e.g.,
rockets) that have  a ready market, this perspective  has a modicum of truth.  But  in the
case  of  civilian  inventions,  or  technologies  that  have  not  yet  been  embodied  in
commercialized  products,  this approach  is  less  realistic.  Nevertheless,  the prospect  of
generating  easy revenues  has  complicated  the  IP  ownership  discussion.  Rather  than
focusing  on  what  ownership  system  is  most  conducive  to  commercialization  of
innovations, the formation of new science-intensive  enterprises,  and the modernization of
existing  "old  economy"  enterprises  so  that  they  can  become  competitive  in a  global
knowledge based  economy,  the debate has been  muddied by questions  of how to  share
the  "pot  of gold."  This in  turn has  given  rise  to  a  series  of conflicting  decrees,  State
Concept Papers,  proposed amendments  to  the Patent Law  and proposed amendments  to
the  IP  sections  of the  Civil  Code.  As  a  result,  the  question  of who  should  own
government funded IP has still not been resolved.48
47  If these  Russian  inventions  were  not  patented  abroad,  then  the  use  of the  invention  abroad  is
perfectly  legal  according  to  international  patent law  and  conventions.  Therefore,  some  Russian
policy makers  have  suggested  that  the  Government  should  tax  exports  that  contain  a  significant
proportion of non-patented,  budget-funded IP.
48  This  confusion  is  reportedly  having  a  chilling  effect  on  at  least  some  promising  technology
commercialization  programs.  "The Russian  legislation  in the  area of IP  stipulated  by the  Law  on
Patents  and other laws to this  effect,  with  its certain  merits  for private patent owners,  fails  to take
into  account  the  interests  of the  State  which  has  funded  most  of the  results  of  scientific  and
technological activities.  This  incompleteness of the legislation happened to cause heavy losses in the
scientific  and technological  potential  not only  for the  State...but for private  owners of these rights
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the  IP  that  was  created  with  budget  resources.  If  approved,  the  proposed  draft
amendments  to the  Third  Section  of the  Civil  Code  would  enshrine  this  view  in  the
fundamental  laws of Russia.  In the  meantime,  and as a stop-gap  measure, this  view is
reflected  in  two  current  government  resolutions  --  one  passed  in  1998  related  to
ownership of military and dual use technology49 and the other passed in 1999  related to
ownership of IP in general.  But both seem to arrive at the same conclusion.
For example,  the  decree  related to  military  and dual use  technology  declares  that "the
rights to such results of research and development  and technological projects of military,
special,  and  dual  use  designation  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "results  of  intellectual
activities")  as may have been obtained  for the account of the RSFSR republican budget,
the portion of the USSR state budget that represented  the USSR budget, and the federal
budget shall belong to the Russian Federation.  (emphasis added).50 The second resolution
declares,  "the rights to such results of scientific and technological  activities  as may have
too.  Foreign investors, mindful  of the rigorous  legislation of their countries refused to invest in the
science  intensive  real  sector because  they had no confirmation  that all  issues concerning  property
rights had been settled."  Yuri Yudintsev, "Intellectual  Policy Calls  for a State Policy,"  Intellectual
Property  July  2000.  A  similar sentiment  was  expressed  by Andrei  Svinarenko,  currently  First
Deputy Minister of Industry,  Science  and Technology.  "The situation is aggravated by disorder in
intellectual property rights law, particularly uncertainty about the ownership of industrial technology
and scientific-technical  knowledge  from  the  Soviet period.. .During  the  Soviet era,  all  technology
created  in the  defense  sector  belonged  to the  government,  de facto but  this ownership  was never
legally defined. The reorganization of government agencies  in recent years, along with the increased
independence  of  enterprises,  has  resulted  in  further  indefiniteness.  Foreign  parterns  are  often
completely  puzzled:  with whom  should  the  conduct  negotiations,  when  owners  of a number  of
different  organizations  present  themselves  as  the  owners  of existing  "know  how."  Andrei  G.
Svinarenko,  "Economic  Policy and High Technology  in Russia,"  presented in Russian  Science and
Industrial Policy:  Moscow and the Regions, Conference Report. March 24-25,  1997.
49  This debate has been complicated by rent seeking  behavior.  By contrast with civilian technology,  a
larger share of military/dual use technology has already been commercialized  and is currently being
exported  in  the  form of weapons.  Hence,  some  influential  groups  believe  that  ownership  of this
technology  can  generate  "a pot of gold"  for  those  ministries  which  funded  the  creation  of this
technology.  This has  led  others  to  suggest that  a similar pot of gold  may also  exist  for civilian
technology.  Thus, the  debate  is not merely  a question of what  ownership  structure  will maximize
commercialization  but  what  ownership  structure  will  maxiniize  rents  and  what  organization  or
individual  should  collect these rents.  For a more detailed  discussion of this rent seeking  issue, V.
Babkin,  "Specifics  of the State  Policy of Introducing  Into Economic  Turnover Results  of Research
and  Development  Activities,"  Presentation  at the  Parliamentary  Hearings  on  State  Protection  of
Intellectual  Property in the Russian Federation,  May  23, 2000.  Reprinted  in Intellectual  Property,
July 2000.
50  The  military  and  dual use  proposals  are  codified  in  a  Presidential  Decree  and  subsequent  GOR
implementing  resolution.  For  the  complete  text  see,  Decree  of the  President  of  the  Russian
Federation  # 556,  On  the  Legal  Protection of the Results  of Military.  SRecial  and Dual-Purpose
Research  and  Development.  Engineering  and  Technological  Works.  May  14,  1998.  Also  see
Resolution of the Government  # 1132,  On Priority Measures  of Legal Protection  of the State  in the
Process  of  Economic  and  Civil-Law  Turnover  of  Results  of  Research-and-Development  and
Technological Projects of Militarv.  Special and Dual-Purpose Designation, September 29, 1998.
- 25 -been previously obtained for the account of the RSFSR republican budget, that portion of
the USSR budget that represented the USSR budget,  and the federal budget shall belong
to the Russian Federation. (emphasis added).  51
The alternative  view  suggests that the government  should own only  a portion of the  IP
created  with budget  funds.  This view  is not enshrined  in any official  laws or decrees.
However,  a  draft  State  Policy Concept  Paper  (still  awaiting  approval  via Government
Resolution) observes52,  "Since the  State at present  does not have sufficient resources  for
commercializing all budget-funded IP, direct assignment of rights for budget funded IP to
the  State  will not resolve  the  issue of IP  commercialization."  Therefore,  the  Concept
Paper asserts,  "The State, represented by federal executive bodies.. .shall secure  for itself
exclusive rights for only those  scientific and technical  activity results that are related to
defense  and  national  security,  as well  as  the  rights  for  those  scientific  and  technical
activity results in relation to which the State intends to promote development to industrial
utilization  and sales of finished products.  In all other instances,  the rights for scientific
and technical  activity results  shall be  transferred  to corporate developers  who would be
responsible for effective commercialization of the above IP." 53
The  1998  Concept  Paper  identifies  critical  technologies  that  merit  various  forms  of
government  assistance.  It goes on to identify  the various ways that the  government  can
help  to commercialize  these critical  technologies  - innovation  insurance,  state  venture
capital funds, tax policy, etc.  But it does not explain who will actually own this IP.  More
importantly,  neither the Concept Papers or the Decrees  explain how the Government will
manage the IP that it owns?  How will it "introduce it into the economic turnover?"  How
will it ensure that this IP will be used to modernize the technological base of the Russian
economy and fundamentally improve the competitiveness of domestic products."
51  See Decree of the President  of the  Russian Federation  #863,  On the  Public Policy of Introducing
into  the  Economic  Turnover  Results  of Scientific  and  Technological  Activities  and  Intellectual
Property  in the  Sphere of Science  and  Technology,  July  22,  1998.  Also  see,  Resolution  of the
Government  of the Russian  Federation  #982,  On  the  Implementation  of Results  of Scientific  and
Technological Activities, September 2,  1999.
52  The draft resolution  is entitled,  "On Priority Measures  for Putting Scientific  and Technical Activity
Results  Obtained  at the  Expense  of Budgetary Funds  into  Use  in the  Economy."  The companion
State Concept Paper has the same title.  Both documents  were considered  at a January 2001 meeting
of the Government and are still awaiting final approval.
53  The  Innovative  Economy  chapter  of the  Government's  economic  reform  program  echoes  the
sentiments  of this  Concept  Paper.  It  states,  for example,  "It  is  advisable  for  the  state  to  retain
exclusive rights only to the results of scientific  and technological  activity related to the interests of
defense and national  security,  as well as rights to the  results of scientific  and technological  activity
with  respect  to  which  it  intends  to  independently  take  developments  through  to  their  industrial
application  and  the  marketing  of finished  products.  In  all  other  cases,  rights  to  the  results  of
scientific  and technological activity should be turned over to the organizations  that have developed  a
new technology and that will themselves deal directly with investors."  Unfortunately,  nowhere  is  it
explained  how the government will  define defense and national security areas.  The latter category
could be  exceedingly  broad.  For  example,  will  the  state define  its  intention  referring  to  specific
packets  of IP, citing  AC and patent numbers?  Or, will  it choose  a broad area  such as  "composite
materials and related technologies"?  Rather than clarifying  matters, the latter approach would inject
even more uncertainty into the IP ownership discussion.
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Russian policy makers  are  confronting  a unique  S&T/enterprise  restructuring  dilemma.
For example,  when Israel and Finland initiated their policies to promote science-intensive
industrial development,  it is doubtful that they faced a similar constellation of issues - (i)
a  large industrial  base that  has been  shrinking  almost  continuously for ten  years,  (ii)  a
dire  need  for  enterprise  restructuring,  (iii)  the  need  to  tackle  vested  interests  in  the
process of restructuring  a powerful  S&T  establishment,  (iv)  a large  stock of existing  IP
that  could  represent  either  a  potential  pot  of  gold  or  an  attic  filled  with  obsolete
technology,  (v) malfunctioning  or non-functioning  financial and capital markets,  and (vi)
the impact on the R&D environment  wielded by government  institutions with no explicit
responsibility for science policy, including the State Tax Inspection,  the Ministry of State
Property,  and the  State  Customs  Committee.  Simply replicating  policies  adopted  by
Finland  and  Israel  will  likely not  solve  Russia's  problems.  But ignoring  international
lessons of experience  is not a wise alternative either.
In  designing  an  agenda  for  future  policy  initiatives,  it  may  be  helpful  to  keep  the
following in mind:
GOR has been extremely  active in the field of S&T reform.  They have produced myriad
Concept  Papers,  decrees,  resolutions,  and  proposed  amendments  to  laws.  In  addition,
GOR  has  established  venture  funds,  Science  Cities,  Innovation  Technology  Centers,
incubators,  and  a  variety  of  other  mechanisms  ostensibly  designed  to  stimulate
technology  commercialization  and revitalize the  S&T  sector.  Thus, whatever  problems
remain  in the sector cannot  be attributed  to a  shortage  of Government  attention,  effort,
and/or programs.
Government  actions  fall  into  two  broad  categories.  First  there  are  strategies  without
tactics  --  broad  general  policy  statements of a  hortatory nature.  For  example,  a  draft
decree  approved  at  a  January  18,  2001  Cabinet  of Ministers  meeting  declares  that the
Ministry  Industry,  Science  and  Technology  shall  "determine  procedures  for
commercializing  IP,  the  rights  for  which  are  assigned  to  the  Russian  Federation,  in
accordance  with the specifics of such [P."  Nowhere is there a clear statement about how
this general objective is to be achieved.  Second,  there are tactics without strategies  --  a
large number of micro policies which cannot be aggregated to deduce an overall strategy.
A.  STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS
Recommendation  #1.  Define  a series  of realistic  goals  and objectives  for Russian
S&T  policy  and identify  agencies  to implement  them.  This would  enable  specific
strategies  and tactics  to be measured  against a clearly defined  yardstick - namely,  how
well do they accomplish the goals and objectives.
The  task  of preparing  and  agreeing  these  goals  and  objectives  may  not be  simple  or
obvious.  The choices  facing Russian  science and technology policy makers  are fraught
with  trade-offs,  ambiguities,  and  contradictions.  Determining  the  optimal  series  of
- 27 -objectives  in  this policy  environment  will demand  analysis  and evaluation  of complex
trade-offs.
For example, one of the most important issues facing Russia policy makers is whether to
place priority on policies that foster the production of knowledge by Russian  scientists or
the consumption of knowledge by Russian enterprises.  Put differently,  at this stage in its
development  and competitive position  in the  global knowledge  economy,  should Russia
emphasize  its role as a producer of global knowledge or its need to consume  knowledge
produced outside Russia?  And if Russia is going to be a producer of knowledge,  should
it focus on intemal or external sources of demand?  On basic, fundamental  research or on
more applied, commercially-oriented  research?
Russian  policy  makers  have  not  yet  addressed  these  issues  in  a  satisfactory,
comprehensive fashion.  For example, most Russian  policy makers would argue that  at a
time when technology is a leading factor of production and the primary source of national
wealth  and  economic  growth,  Russia  should  use  its  vast  S&T assets  as  a resource  for
domestic  economic  growth.  But what  does this  mean  in practice  and  how  can this be
accomplished in reality?
At first  glance this objective would appear sensible,  logical and self evident.  Russia has
an  abundance  (an  over  abundance  according  to  the  1993  OECD  analysis)  of trained
scientists.  So it stands to reason that these human  resources should be used to revive the
domestic economy.  But how will this be accomplished?  Despite the economic upturn of
the  past  few  years,  there  is  still  no  or very  low  internal  demand  for  science.  Many
Russian  enterprises  still  do  not  have  the  financial  resources  to  finance  new  plant  and
equipment, not to mention large scale R&D programs.  As a result, one could argue that
much  of the  future  demand  for  Russian  science  will  most  likely  come  from  outside
Russia.  This,  in  turn,  would  suggest  that  if Russia  hopes  to  remain  a  world  class
producer  of knowledge,  both  its  research  and  commercialization  programs  should  be
more  deeply  integrated  into  the  global  economy.  Accomplishing  this  objective  will
require a greater emphasis  on the search  for strategic partners  who can help to shepherd
Russian  R&D  projects  from  the  laboratory  to  the  market,  strategic  partnerships  with
foreign  firms  who  are  active  in  complementary  R&D  fields,  a  search  for  high  tech,
sophisticated  customers  who  would be  likely to  purchase  the  output  of Russia's R&D
establishment,  and foreign  direct  investment within  Russia by both traditional high tech
firms (e.g.,  Intel,  Microsoft)  and such old economy firms  as Boeing, Pratt and Whitney,
and General Motors.
A complementary  (or perhaps  alternative)  approach,  which  would appear to be favored
by Russian policy makers, would be to increase  the internal demand  for Russian science.
But this approach, however  desirable in theory,  is  fraught with numerous  problems and
practical implementation challenges.  For example,  Government policy may need to need
to place  a greater relative emphasis  on applied  research, thereby  reducing  the emphasis
on  "prestige"  basic  research.  To  date,  Russian  policy  makers  have  been  reluctant  to
- 28 -embrace this reform.  Indeed, recent statements by top Russian officials would even seem
to suggest that they are placing renewed  emphasis on basic research.54
Moreover,  the success of any program that emphasizes domestic demand for S&T will be
critically  dependent  on the behavior  of domestic  enterprises.  How will they modernize
and  improve  their  competitiveness?  Will  they  rely  on  Russia's  homegrown  S&T
resources or will they chose instead to rely on imported machinery and capital goods with
embedded foreign knowledge,  science and technology?  Anecdotal evidence  suggests that
most Russian enterprises  are reviewing  such factors  as  quality,  reliability  and  technical
sophistication  and  selecting  imported  equipment  rather  than  Russian-made  equipment.
That may be  a wise choice  from  a corporate  investment perspective.  But if so,  it  may
also suggest  that,  if Russia  remains  on its  current  policy course,  the  task of upgrading
domestic  enterprises and the task of relying on domestic demand  to improve the  market
orientation  of  domestic  S&T  resources  may  be  independent  processes.  Is  this
independence sustainable?  Is it wise?  Is it the best way to proceed?  Should these trends
be  encouraged?  Are  there  market-friendly  policies  that  can  create  greater  linkages
between Russia's S&T resources  and the domestic enterprise  sector?
In  drafting  their  goals  and  objectives,  Russian  policy  makers  need  to  sort  out  these
priorities and  address these questions.  To date,  however,  they seem  to be skirting these
issues.  For example,  as  noted  in Section  lIc,  above,  the  chapter  of the  Government's
economic  program dealing with the development  of an innovative economy begins with
the dubious observation that "Russia has the potential to develop in practically every area
of scientific  and  technological  progress."  In  other  words,  fundamental  choices  and
priorities are not necessary.  Russia can do  everything.  The chapter observes  that "the
question of whether Russia will be a state with a powerful  economy and high-technology
industry,  whether  it will  restore  a  strong  science,  and  whether  Russian  scientists  will
regain  their positions  in the world  scientific  community  is more urgent  that it has ever
been."  True enough.  But what policies will the Russian government adopt to meet these
challenges?  The report describes a ten year, three-phase program purportedly designed to
convert  Russia from a predominantly natural  resource  exporting economy  to a producer
of world class, research intensive  products that can be sold on both domestic  and foreign
markets.  This process  is supposed  to culminate  in 2007-2010  with the  appearance  of a
vaguely defined "innovation-based  stage of development."
The mechanisms  for generating this transition are rather ill defined  and too general to be
of any practical  use to policy makers.  They consist of such policy recommendations  as
(i)  orient innovations  "toward the modernization  of existing production  facilities  ...  and
toward  the  improvement  of  products'  attractiveness  to  consumers,"  (ii)  "establish
production  facilities  that  employ  state-of-the-art  technologies  and  enter  domestic  and
foreign  markets  with  world-class  research-intensive  products;"  (iii)  "concentrate
resources  in breakthrough  areas  of scientific  and  technological  development  and  form
new  production  and  technological  entities;"  and  (iv)  "attract  considerable  financial
54  "Annual Message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly," April 3,  2001  as
quoted in Irina Deshina and Loren Graharn, "Russian Basic Science,  Changes Since the Collapse of the
Soviet Union and the Impact  of International  Support" Paper  presented at the Royal  Society, London,
October 22,  2001.
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military  equipment"  and  establish  mechanisms  to  transfer  those  funds  into  the
"innovation-based track of economic development."
For the most part,  these policies  can be  described  as  "logical  wishfulness."  Over long
historical  epochs,  market  economies  have  evolved  from  primary  production  to  the
production  of more  science  and knowledge  intensive  products.  And in  the process  of
getting  from  the  starting  point  to  the  finish  line,  production  facilities  have  been
modernized,  state  of the  art  production  facilities  have  been  established,  and  financial
resources  have  been  directed  toward  high  tech  investments  and  away  from  resource
extraction.  But these developments  are  the result and consequence  of the transition to a
modem,  knowledge  intensive  economy;  they  are  not  the  actual  mechanisms  used  to
generate the transition.
Two recent studies highlight  some of the complex challenges  that Russian policy makers
and business executives will have to overcome if Russia is to move from a predominantly
raw material  exporting economy to a high tech, knowledge  intensive  economy.  The first
study  examines  the  "institutions  and  economic  policies  supportive  of high  rates  of
economic  growth in the medium term"  and ranks 75  countries on the basis of a Growth
Competitiveness  Index  (GCI).55  The GCI utilizes three major  sets of variables:  (i)  an
economy's  capacity  both  to  innovate  and  absorb  technologies  generated  by  other
innovative economies,  (ii)  the quality of its public  institutions and (iii) the quality of its
macroeconomic  environment.  According to this methodology,  Russia  ranks 63rd  out of
75  economies,  on  a  par  with  Venezuela,  Bulgaria,  and  Indonesia  and  below  every
transition  economy included  in the study except Ukraine.  Russia's ranking  on all three
sets of variables is uniformly low.
However,  even  more  interesting  than  the  rankings  is  the  report's  discussion  of  the
challenges  facing an economy as it moves through three stages of economic development
starting  with  resource  extraction,  then  proceeding  to  the  stage of investment  in which
economic  growth  is  driven  by  the  process  of harnessing  global  technology  to  local
production and culminating in the emergence of an innovative economy in which growth
is  driven  primarily  by the  development  and  sale  of new  technologies  and  innovative
products on global markets.  In the first, place, as the authors point out, each stage has its
own  unique  set of challenges  and  policy  requirements.  During the  "Factor  Driven,"
resource  extraction  phase,  the  main  challenge  is  the  establishment  of policies  that  are
conducive  to  the  organization  of efficient  markets  for land,  labor  and capital  and  the
establishment  of a  business  climate  that  supports  capital  accumulation.  During  the
"Investment  Driven"  stage,  the main public policy task is the integration of the national
economy  into  the global  division of labor.  And  during the "Innovative  Driven"  stage,
public policy must foster the rapid  and repeated  development  and commercialization  of
new technologies.
55  Michael  E.  Porter,  Jeffrey  D.  Sachs,  et.  al.,  The  Global  Competitiveness  Report  2001-2002  Oxford
University  Press,  2002,  p.  16.  For  complete  details  of  the  rankings,  GCI  methodology,  and
components  of the  GCI,  see  Chapter  1.1.  For  supporting  studies  on National  Innovative  Capacity,
Economic Creativity, and the technology composition of  economic  trade,  see Chapters 2.2-2.4.
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involve  countries  getting  stuck  at  critical  junctures  of economic  transition:  between
Factor  Driven  and  Investment  Driven  or  Between  Investment  Driven  and  Innovation
Driven stages....The shift from one phase of development  to the next often requires new
ways of organizing governments, markets and enterprises  so it is not altogether surprising
therefore  that  many  countries  fail  at  making  appropriate  transitions  or  even  fail  to
recognize  that  such  a  transition  is  needed....Ironically,  old  strategies  become  new
weaknesses."
A second study describing how firms innovate  and use knowledge evaluates  enterprises
on  the  basis  of nine  key  dimensions  of technological  capability.56 These  variables
encompass  such factors  as a firm's  ability to develop  a coherent technology strategy to
support  the  business,  acquire  and absorb  technologies,  form  and exploit  linkages with
networks of suppliers and collaborators, plus several other core competencies.  Firms are
then placed in one of four categories depending on their level of technological  capability.
At the  lowest level  are firms  that have absolutely no capacity  for technological  change.
At the highest level are fimns such as Intel, Boeing, or Microsoft which have the capacity
to absorb technologies  from around the world, innovate, and produce  leading  edge high
tech  products.  None  of the  leading  Korean  firms  are  in  the  top tier.  Firms  such  as
Hyundai,  LG,  and  Samsung  are  only  in  the  third  category.  They  can  produce  and
assemble  high  tech  products  using  technology  imported  from  abroad,  but  they  cannot
innovate or generate their own leading edge technologies.
As both studies imply, making  a ten year leap from a resource  extraction  economy to  a
global  innovator  may  be  overly  ambitious.  Russia's  factor  markets  are  just  getting
organized, Russia has very few enterprises that can compete with a Samsung or Hyundai
in the production of globally competitive  mass produced consumer or capital goods, most
Russian  enterprises  do not  have  the high  levels  of technological  capability  required  to
compete  with  other  globally  competitive  innovative  firms,  and  the  Russia  innovation
system,  if no longer  on the verge of collapse,  is  far from being  in robust  good  health.
Remedying  these  problems  will  require  major policy,  institutional  and  organizational
changes that  go far beyond the issue of redistributing  financial resources from one sector
to another - although given the lack of an efficient banking system and domestic  capital
market,  even  this  limited objective  may be beyond reach.  Russia's mission  statement
should  take  these  organizational  complexities  and  difficulties  into  account.  There  is
nothing  wrong  with  ambitious  goals,  provided  realistic  measures  are  envisioned  to
achieve those objectives.
Recommendation  #2.  Audit a large, representative sample of Russian enterprises to
assess  their  technological  absorption  and  development  capacity.  Based  on
international  lessons  of  experience,  develop  specific  policies  to  help  Russian
enterprises at each  stage in the development  process  to improve their technological
capabilities  and attain higher levels  of sophistication.  As the  preceding  discussion
56  World Bank, Korea: How Firms Use Knowledge.  Part A: Firm Level Innovations  in the Korean
Economy. 2002.
-31  -suggests,  Russian  enterprises  will  have  to  improve  their  technical  capability  if the
Russian  economy  is  to  have  any  chance  of making  a  successful  transition  from  a
Resource Extraction phase of development  to an Investment or Innovation Driven stage
of development.  Researchers  have  developed  a  fairly simple  audit  tool  to  assess  the
technical  capability of enterprises.  Russian policy makers  should utilize this audit tool to
assess  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  a  large  representative  sample  of  Russian
enterprises.  Based on the weaknesses  revealed by the audit and  international  lessons of
experience,  they should develop  specific  targeted  strategies  that would help enterprises
improve in areas where they are deficient and achieve higher levels of sophistication.
Recommendation  #3.  Review  the factors responsible for Russia's poor performance
on  the Growth  Competitiveness  Index  and develop  policies  to correct  the  critical
weaknesses.  The GCI is composed of numerous variables.  Although Russia's  overall
score  is low,  even  with the technology  related cluster  of variables  there are pockets  of
strength  (notably  areas  related  to patenting  and higher  education),  areas  where  GOR is
already addressing areas of relative weakness (e.g.,  use of ICT and the intemet which is a
major  focus of the  eRussia and  e-Education  programs),  and  areas  of serious  deficiency
(variables  related  to  the  ability to  absorb  technology  from  abroad  and  integrate  it  into
domestic  production  processes,  establish  strategic  alliances,  etc.)  Similar  patterns  of
strength and weakness  are evident in the public institutions and macroeconomic  stability
portions  of the  index.  GOR  should  examine  the  revealed  pattern  of strengths  and
weaknesses,  see which areas  are not being  addressed  by  current  reform  programs,  and
take steps to begin addressing these issues.
B.  LINKAGES  AND INCUBATORS
High  tech,  science  intensive  enterprises  do  not  thrive  and  prosper  in  an  economic
vacuum.  They  thrive  and  prosper only  as  part  of a much  larger  regional,  national  or
global  value  chain.  Fostering  these  critically  important  linkages  requires  at  least  two
critical  preconditions.  The  first  is a prosperous  (local,  regional  and/or  national)  large
enterprise  sector  that  produces  high  value  added  products  with  inputs  from  Russian
enterprises.57 The second  is a group of enterprise  managers  who  understand  the nature
and importance of these value chain linkages and who are driven by the desire to move to
a higher position on the  value  chain.  Neither  prerequisite  is present  to  any significant
extent  in  the Russian  economy.  As  noted  above,  Russia does  not  yet  possess  a truly
dynamic  core of large enterprises - similar even to those which exist in Korea -- with the
capacity to absorb technology and generate strategic linkages with sophisticated suppliers
and  customers.  And  most  Russian  enterprises  do  not  have  close  linkages  to healthy
foreign enterprises.  Moreover,  most Russian enterprise managers do not yet see the need
57  An interesting  question is whether  former Financial  Industrial Groups  (FIGs), now renamed Industrial
Business Groups  (IBGs), can play this dynamic  role in the Russian economy.  Two  interesting  articles
with an optimistic assessment of the potential positive role of IBGs can be found in Alexander Dinkin,
Integrated  Business  Groups:  A  Breakthrough  Toward  Modernizing  The  Country,  unpublished  ms,
2001;  and Al  Breach,  "The  FIGs'  Return  - Emphasis  on  'Industrial'  This  Time,"  Goldman  Sachs
Emerging Market Economics Analyst, May 18, 2001.
- 32 -for establishing  these  linkages.  A truly vibrant  enterprise  sector will  not emerge  until
these deficiencies are remedied.58
Moreover,  the workforce  of many Russian  high tech  SMEs currently  consists  of semi-
skilled workers with screw drivers and soldering irons assembling high tech gadgets  that
were designed and invented by a scientist owner-manager.  These so-called screwdriver
assembly  firms  are a high tech version of the industrial revolution.  For these scientist-
entrepreneurs,  merely  surviving over the past ten tumultuous years was a victory and an
achievement  worthy of note.  Having won the battle for survival, many of these science-
intensive  enterprises  are content to compete  for a share of the CIS  or emerging country
market.  They explain  that the quality of their products  is  80% of the quality available
from western manufacturers but at a price that is 30% or 40% of  the western price.  All in
all, they believe that they are delivering value for money.  And indeed they are.  But they
also know that their firms are not competitive  on the  global stage.  Serving the  CIS and
emerging markets is an excellent  short term, crisis survival  strategy.  But is this strategy
and are these emerging market customers a stepping stone to a higher position on the on
the value chain or a dead end?  Will these markets slowly disappear  as these customers
get  wealthier  and  start consuming higher quality  goods?  Will Russian  firms use these
sales revenues to invest in additional R&D and to upgrade their production quality so that
they can meet the higher quality demands of their existing customers  and to attract new
customers?  Or are they merely surviving by selling their inherited  stock of intellectual
capital.  In other words,  is the CIS market niche a stepping  stone to more sophisticated
markets or a dead end destination?  Unfortunately,  most Russian high tech enterprises do
not yet  have  the skills,  strategic  linkages,  and business contacts  needed to use the  CIS
market as a stepping stone to higher value added niches.59
58  The  Russian  operations  of Boeing,  Ikea,  Pratt  and Whitney,  and  McDonalds  would  appear  to  be
exemplary  in  this  regard.  Boeing  reportedly  helped  several  Russian  finns  meet  the  international
quality standards required to supply material and parts for international airliner production.  Similarly,
Ikea,  Pratt  and  Whitney  and McDonalds  have  developed  local  SME  supplier  networks.  Via  its
Backward  Linkages  program  the IFC  is hoping to develop  similar  supplier networks  in conjunction
with  its investment  in Ford's Russia operations.  In each case, the local  SMEs are trained to meet the
exacting  quality standards of a dynamic,  multinational  corporate customer.  In effect, these local SMEs
have  found  a niche  in the global  value chain.  Dynamic Russian  enterprises  with links  to the global
economy could offer similar benefits to Russian suppliers.  Whether these enterprises  will emerge  and
play this role is still an open question.
59  For example, a recent study of research institutes in Novosibirsk reports that even though the institutes
are  exporting  successfully,  they  are  not  on  a  long  term  sustainable  development  path.  They  are
exploiting  their inherited intellectual  capital,  which is another form of brain drain and which does not
lead  to  long  term  renewal  of their  physical  or  intellectual  capital  stock.  This  was  a  reasonable
defensive  strategy at the beginning of the transition period, but it has become a dead end strategy ten
years  later.  For example,  one firm is producing what are  now viewed as low  tech computer chips.
They've survived by moving  down  the  value  chain.  Another firm is producing  a cutting  edge,  high
tech  equipment  for the  Russian  market.  Unfortunately,  most Russian  customers  cannot  afford  this
particular piece of sophisticated  equipment and the local  enterprise  does not have neither the financial
or  managerial  capacity  nor  the  reputation  for  quality  and  service  that  are  required  to  compete
successfully in international markets with western multinational  firms.
By comparison,  recent studies of Intel's impact on Costa Rica suggests that when Intel located a major
manufacturing facility in Costa Rica, it didn't merely produce goods and services in Costa Rica.  It also
procured  local  goods and  services  from firms  in Costa  Rica  and Central America.  But  Intel  is  a
- 33 -The lack of linkages, in turn, is a deterrent to the emergence  of a dynamic venture  capital
industry in Russia.  Indeed, Russia is facing  a classic chicken  and egg dilemma in terms
of venture  capital.  Many  venture  capitalists  argue  that  Russia  has  a  shortage  of
"bankable  deals."  By  this  they  mean  enterprises  with  solid  marketing  prospects  in
Europe,  North  America  and  Japan  and  a  vision  for  forming  the  sort  of marketing,
technology and long term developmental  alliances that an enterprise needs to develop if it
is to  become  the  sort of world class  technology  enterprise  that  venture  capitalists  find
attractive.  At the same time,  many Russian high tech enterprises  are looking to venture
capitalists  to provide the strategic  direction and vision that will help them  find a higher
value added niche on the global value chain.  Thus, venture  capitalists  argue that Russia
does not have the  strategic vision which  venture  capitalists are seeking  in  a prospective
investment and Russian  enterprises  argue  that they need venture  capitalists  precisely to
provide this absent strategic vision.
Recommendation  #4.  To  break  this  vicious  circle,  GOR  should  support  the
establishment  of  commercially  oriented  technology  incubators  that will  nurture
promising  high  tech  enterprises  and make  them  suitable  candidates  for venture
capital  financing.  Most  of the  existing  incubators  in  Russia  provide  custodial  care.
They  are  primarily  controlled  work  spaces  designed  initially  to  help  fledgling  firms
survive  in  the midst of a  hostile  environment  - one  in  which  land  is  difficult 'to rent,
utility  connections  are  difficult  to  organize,  and  petty  harassment  (or  worse)  from
bureaucratic  inspectors is an unfortunate but common fact of life.  Once a firm enters one
of these incubators,  it is under no pressure to leave.  Many Russian high tech  SMEs have
remained in these incubators for ten or more years.  These custodial incubators may have
served a useful purpose during the early phase of the transition process.  But today, their
custodial function is best served by eliminating the administrative barriers hampering the
emergence  of new  SMEs  and the  growth of existing  SMEs.  This  sort of incubator,  in
other words, should be supplanted by the  rule of law and clear,  transparent  and sensible
business regulations.60
At the  same time,  Russia should  support the development  of the type  of commercially
oriented  incubators  found  for example  in Israel,  Europe and the US.  These  incubators
can be defined  as "A location in which entrepreneurs can receive pro-active, value-added
support,  and  access  to  critical  tools,  information,  education,  contacts,  resources  and
capital-that  may otherwise be unaffordable, inaccessible or unknown.  A  technology
incubator's management  team facilitates the  interaction between each  business and these
resources,  and  coaches  each  business  through  a  development  process  such  that  the
demanding  customer.  It insisted  on high quality production  and on time  delivery.  Intel  helped  local
SMEs  in Costa Rica  and Central America  upgrade  their production  facilities  so that they  could meet
Intel's demanding  quality standards.  Many of these  firms are now able to serve Intel as well  as other
global high  tech  firms.  Their linkage  to Intel  enabled them  to generate additional  linkages to  other
world class firms.  This sort of virtuous circle/ upgrading process seems to be missing in Russia.
60  Comprehensive  reconmuendations  for  improving  the  business  climate  can  be  found  in  the
Govemment's economic  reform program as well as in Administrative  Barriers  To Investment  Within
Subjects  Of The  Russian  Federation.  Report  of the  Foreign  Investment  Advisory  Service,  a  joint
service of the International  Finance Corporation and the World Bank, September  2001.
- 34 -resulting  venture  provides  all  participants  with  an  acceptable  rate  of return  on  their
investment."61
More specifically,  a well structured  incubator provides  (i)  links to industry,  universities
and research  institutes,  (ii) business  support  services to  enhance  and  develop  business,
(iii)  daily hands-on  managerial  mentoring  (general  management,  finance,  accounting,
marketing,  production,  R&D),  (iv) technological  advice  and assistance  with intellectual
property protection, (v) financial resources  for R&D and initial marketing expenses,  (vi)
access to potential private investors and strategic partners,  and (vii) training and coaching
so that entrepreneurs  have a  better understanding  of how to deal  with potential  foreign
investors  and  strategic  partners.  By  the  end  of the  incubation  period,  the  enterprise
should be able to raise additional funds from investors and continue operating  the project
independently. 62
These incubators operate under  a rigorous selection process.  Not all firms that apply for
entry are accepted.  An entrant typically pays for the incubator's  services by giving the
incubator  operator  a  predetermiined  share  of  equity  in  the  new  venture.  Finally,
incubators operate under a rigorous "up or out" procedure.  Firms typically remain in the
incubator  for no more than two years.  At the  end of that time period,  they are  either a
commercial  success,  and  therefore  no  longer  eligible  to  remain  in the  incubator,  or  a
commercial failure,  in which case they are obliged to leave the incubator in order to make
room for more promising candidates.
As  part  of their  long  term  relationship-building  processes,  these  new-style  Russian
technology  incubators  could  use  intemships  and  marketing  arrangements  to  establish
links  with  incubators  promoting  similar technologies  in the  US,  Europe  and Asia.  In
addition, these Russian incubators could be encouraged  to establish  linkages with leading
venture  capital  funds  in Asia,  Europe  or the  US  that specialize  in the development  of
related technologies.  These venture  capital funds  are typically supporting  a portfolio  of
firms  that  need  to  solve  complex  technological  problems  before  they  can  bring  a
technology to market.  Russian firms can offer to conduct contract research  or other high
tech  services  for those  firms  under the  tutelage of US  or European  venture  capitalists.
Over  time,  these  lower  level  commercial  research  relationships  might  result  in  the
creation of strategic alliances  or second generation joint ventures which could be funded
by the venture capitalists.  The objective, in other words, would be to ensure that Russian
high tech enterprises  develop  the  relationships  and  linkages  with demanding  customers
that the  Russian enterprise  needs if it is to  move  to progressively higher  levels  on the
global value chain.
61  Technology Innovation Centers: A Guide to Principles and Best Practices.  Report prepared  for the US
Departnent of Commerce by Claggett Wolfe Associates, December  1999, p. 1.
62  Adopted from Timo Hokkannen, unpublished IFC manuscript, November 2001.
- 35 -C.  GOVERNMENT  PROGRAMS
Government  spending  on  science,  technology  and  research  declined  dramatically  for
most of the past ten years, both in real  absolute terms and  as a percentage  of GDP and
total government  spending.  Nevertheless,  government spending  still accounts for nearly
50% of total science and technology spending in Russia, a much larger share than in other
OECD countries  where business  spending  is the predominant  source  of R&D  spending.
Given  the  relative  paucity  of business  spending  and  the  relatively  large  share  of
government  spending,  it  is  more  important  than  ever  to  ensure  that  scarce  budget
resources  are expended in ways that contribute to the evolution of a modem, knowledge
intensive, high tech economy.
Unfortunately,  a recent  analysis of federal  expenditures  on R&D noted that a substantial
portion of budget expenditures  do not contribute  to this objective.  On the contrary, the
report  explains,  existing  Government  R&D  spending  supports  prestige  basic  research
over  more  commercially  relevant  applied  research,  subsidizes  existing  research
institutions  irrespective  of whether  their  research  agenda  is  congruent  with  national
priorities  and  objectives,  promotes  the  institutional  status  quo,  fosters  the  continued
separation  of research  institutes  from  enterprises,  does  little  to  promote  private  R&D
spending,  and  allocates  only  a  small  percentage  of  total  funding  on  the  basis  of
competitive standards of merit.  For example, the report notes:63
"[U]sing  the  need  to  maintain  the  competitive  strength  of the  economy  as  a
reason  for government  interventions in the  R&D sector  implies not so  much the
support  of  fundamental  research  but  incentives  for  the  applied  science  and
innovations....  [T]he  existing  budget  classification  virtually  precludes  planning
and control of expenditures  both from R&D regulation  purposes and objectives'
perspective  and  from  the  standpoint  of  scientific  and  technological  policy
priorities  as  set  by  the  government....  A  strongest  case  for  government
intervention  in  the  civil  science  and  R&D  sector  from  the  standpoint  of the
economy is to ensure a stronger competitive  edge of the national economy within
the framework of international division of labor.  However,  the above objective of
state  aid  provision  to  science  in  Russia  has  not  been  yet  formulated  as  a
government  priority  or  government  policy  objective.  Moreover,  to  a  certain
extent  it  runs  counter  to  the  proclaimed  priority  of the  fundamental  research
support  over aid  to applied  science....Government  financing of R&D to  a larger
extent  aims  to  maintain  the  existing  infrastructure  of  scientific  organizations
rather than to obtain scientific results."
Thus,  whether intentionally  or unintentionally,  Government  R&D  expenditures,  would
appear  to  be  promoting  and preserving  the least  effective  features  of the Soviet  S&T
system.  The  following  recommendations  are  designed  to  increase  the  likelihood  that
63  Fiscal  Policy  Center,  ANALYSIS  OF  FEDERAL  EXPENDITURES  ON  R&D.  MOSCOW-2001,
prepared under U.S. Agency  for International Development Contract OUT-PER-I-00-99-00003-00,  p7,
16, 45, 48 of the English translation.
- 36 -Government  R&D spending  supports  the  emergence  of a new, more productive market
oriented  S&T  system  that will  help  Russia  emerge  as  a  leading  player  in  the  global
knowledge economy:
Recommendation  #5.  Establish  a  clear  set  of  priorities  for  Government  R&D
spending.  As the preceding quote  suggests, Government R&D spending is an amalgam
of programs without clear priorities and objectives.  Thus, before any meaningful reform
can  be  implemented,  representatives  from  the  Government,  Duma,  Presidential
Administration,  scientific  research  community,  universities,  small high tech  enterprises
and  large  industrial  enterprises  should  discuss  and  agree  a  mission  statement  for
Government  R&D spending.  The mission  statement  should  identify  limited,  mutually
consistent,  and  specific  goals  and  priorities  for  Government  R&D  spending.  For
example, is the goal to preserve existing scientific research institutions irrespective of the
quality of their research?  To support basic research and prestige science?  To develop  a
limited number of "centers  of excellence"  that will focus  on critical research  priorities?
To foster Russia's emergence  as a leading player in the global knowledge  economy?  To
support the  emergence  of new  high tech/science  intensive  SMEs?  To  help the  private
sector commercialize  innovations  funded with budget resources?  To strengthen national
defense? To help existing old economy enterprises restructure,  modernize  their plant and
equipment and, in light of Russia's approaching membership  in the WTO, become more
globally competitive?  Something else?
Recommendation  #6.  Align  Government  spending  to  the  agreed  goals  and
priorities. Once new  goals and priorities  have been  established,  it is likely that existing
R&D  expenditure  patterns  will  have  little  or  no  correlation  with  the  new  goals  and
priorities.  Therefore, GOR and the Duma should examine R&D spending on a line item
by line item basis to  see what goal or objective, if any, each item serves.  Items that do
not  promote  the  new  goals  and  objectives  should  be  phased  out  rapidly  or  canceled
outright.  New items should be funded only if they serve a priority objective.
In addition to reviewing the goals and objectives of Government  spending,  GOR should
also realign the  actual spending mechanisms.  The  following recommendations  provide
some suggestions for improving the efficiency of spending mechanisms.
Recommendation  #7.  Establish a clear timetable  for increasing  the portion of the
Federal  R&D  budget  that  is  allocated  on  a  competitive  basis.  Develop  clear,
transparent peer  review  procedures,  utilizing  both  national  and  international
experts,  to evaluate  competing  proposals.  Only 7% of public  spending is allocated  on
a competitive basis, with clear transparent  rules of the gaime, peer review of applications,
and  a clear,  definable  link  between government  goals, priorities  and  spending.  By all
accounts, this portion of the budget is well spent and should be expanded.  Examples of
government  programs  based  on  competitive  funding  allocations  include  the  Fund  for
Assistance  to Small Innovative Enterprises  (FASIE), the Foundation for Basic Research,
and  the  Saint  Petersburg  Fund  for  Science  and  Technology  Development.  The
Foundation  for  Basic  Research,  for  example,  establishes  basic  research  priorities
corresponding  to  the  government's  priority  research  agenda,  has  an  open  tender  for
proposals  to  define  and  implement  specific  research  projects  designed  to  further  the
priority  research  agenda,  and  funds  only those  projects  that have  been  approved  by  a
- 37 -rigorous  peer  review  panel of national  and international  experts.  Institutes  within the
Academy  of Sciences  are  eligible  to  compete  for  funds,  alongside  other private  and
public  research  institutions,  universities,  and  private  enterprises.  The key point  is that
funding is allocated  on the basis of competitive merit,  rather than to selected institutions
on an entitlement  basis (e.g., where funds  are allocated to every research institution that
meets certain eligibility criteria such as membership in the Russian Academy of Sciences,
irrespective of the quality, priority,  and utility of  their research).
Recommendation  #8.  To  foster  the  transition  from  entitlement  funding  to
competitive  funding,  GOR should  conduct  a performance  review  of those  Russian
funds  which  operate  on  a competitive  funding  basis  and compare  their operating
procedures with those used  by  analogous  funds  and research institutions in OECD
countries  (e.g.,  the National Institute of Health  or National  Science  Foundation in
the US,  the Academy  of Finland,  etc.)  On  the basis  of these  lessons of experience,
GOR  should  develop  a  time  bound  action  plan  to  convert  progressive  shares  of
government  spending  from  an  institutional  entitlement  basis  to  a competitive  funding
basis.
Recommendation  #9.  Develop  spending  mechanisms  that foster linkages  between
research institutions,  educational institutions,  and enterprises  and catalyze  private
research spending.  Current Government R&D spending programs tend to reinforce the
old  Soviet practice  of separating research  institutions  and enterprises.  Moreover,  these
spending  programs  do  little  to catalyze  or leverage  private  sector  resources.  All  too
often, government funded civil research priorities are established and government funded
civil research  is conducted with  little regard  for  whether  there  is any need  or effective
demand  for the  eventual  research  results.  This  excessive  concern  with  the  supply  of
innovation and basic research should be balanced with more regard for demand.64
Recommendation  #9A.  One option for solving this problem would be to establish a
tripartite  Government-industry-research  advisory  council  to  recommend  a  limited
number  of basic  research  priorities  for  government  funded  research.  The  actual
research would be financed on the basis of the competitive  funding recommendation
outlined above.
Recommendation  #9B.  A  second,  complementary  approach,  focused  more  on
applied  research,  would  be  to  develop  matching  grant  R&D  programs.  Under  the
terms  of  these  programs,  research  or  educational  institutions  would  receive
government  support  for research  projects  provided  that they are  able  to  attract  co-
64  This problem is not unique to Russia.  A recent World Bank report on the Korean innovation  system
observed,  "Firms  also  feel,  rightly  or  wrongly,  that  Korean  universities  and  government-funded
research  institutes  are  not "in tune"  with their  short, medium,  or long  term needs.  In particular,  in
government policies  for more "basic research"  in the public  sector, industry  felt that this mnis-specified
or over-generalized  real needs... .Equally,  policies  to encourage  more basic research  within industry
were  also  criticized for being out of touch.  Firms  felt that the real needs were for nearer-term,  more
focused  and  applied  research  which  supported  their  strategy  of  moving  towards  new  product
development."  Korea:  How  Firms  Use  Knowledge.  Part A:  Firm-Level  Innovation  in the  Korean
Economy  Unpublished World Bank Manuscript,  2002, Para. 4.8 -4.9.
- 38 -financing from private enterprises.  This would have several beneficial effects.  First,
it would  leverage  federal  and  enterprise  R&D  resources.  Second,  it would  foster
greater  communication  and  interaction  between  the  research  community  and  the
enterprise  community.  Third,  it  would  help  to  stimulate  private  sector  R&D
spending, which in Russia is far below the OECD average.  Fourth,  on the margin it
would  encourage  large  Russian  enterprises  to  purchase  more  R&D  from  domestic
R&D  enterprises  and institutes.  And finally, by ensuring that federally funded R&D
is  channeled  in directions  that are  of greatest interest  to Russian  industry,  it would
help  to  ensure  that  Russia's  R&D  resources  help  to  modernize  and  improve  the
competitiveness  of Russia industry.
Recommendation  #10.  Develop  concrete  mechanisms  to  foster  the
commercialization  of  government  funded  R&D.  At  least  three  separate  policy
initiatives could be undertaken to achieve this objective.
Recommendation  10A.  Bridge  the Innovation  Gap.  Government  support  in
Russia  (and  other  countries  as  well)  for  basic  research  stops  before
commercialization  is  feasible.  As  noted  in  a  recent  OECD  report  on Russia's
innovation system,  "The  Government's  role  in market economies  should remain
simple,  namely:  aim to  diminish the  innovation  risk for the  concerned  parties.
Governments  must use market forces  to stimulate  innovations.  In doing so, they
reduce  the  probability  of technical  and  commercial  failure  in  the  innovation
process  and  increase  the  rewards  for  all  involved,  typically  academia  and
industry.  Academics  and  businessmen  have  different  interests  in  the  process.
Academic  scientists generally have no resources,  no stimuli to continue research
beyond  the  point  at which  it is reasonable  to  expect publication  in  a scientific
journal.  Industry finds this point in the research process  still fraught with risks,
for the knowledge available at this moment is still very remote from being able to
be assessed in market terms, i.e.,  to be able to calculate  any rate of return on the
probable  investments.  Bridging  this  gap,  the  so-called  'innovation  barrier,'
should be a primary objective of Government R&D spending."65
There are a number of ways to accomplish this objective.  For example, the Small
Business  Innovation  Research  (SBIR)  program  sponsored  by  the  US  Small
Business  Administration  (SBA)  is  one  interesting  approach  to  bridging  the
innovation  barrier.  (Brief  descriptions  of  how  the  French  and  Finnish
govermments  help  bridge  the  innovation  barrier  are  available  in Annex  3 and
Annex  4  respectively.)  SBR,  which  was  established  by  the  US  Congress  in
1984.66  has  several  major  objectives.  First, it provides  high tech  entrepreneurs
65  Baruch  Raz, "National  Frameworks for Encouraging  Cooperation Between  Science  and Industry:  The
Case  of Israel,"  Paper  presented  at  the  at  the  Helsinki  Seminar  on  "Innovation  Policy  And The
Valorisation  Of Science  And Technology  In  Russia,"  March  1 -2,  2001  available  at the  web  site
address httM://www.oecd.org/dsti/stil
66  For details of the SBIR program and results of recent evaluations see R.T. Tibbetts, "The Importance of
Small High-Technology Firms to Economic Growth - and How to Nurture Them," Proceedings  of the
Conference  on Technology  Transfer  and  Innovation,  Commonwealth  Institute,  London,  July  2000.
- 39 -with the start up capital  they need  to explore  the commercial  feasibility  of high
risk  research  ideas.  Venture  capitalists  traditionally  have  little  interest  in
providing this early stage financing.  Second,  it fosters the commercialization  of
government  funded R&D.  Third,  it establishes  productive, commercial  linkages
between  high  tech  SMEs  and  Government-funded  research  priorities.  And
finally, "graduates"  of the SBIR program are an excellent  source of deal flow for
venture capitalists.67
Pursuant to the SBIR program,  the Department of Defense,  National Institutes of
Health, NASA, Department  of Energy, National Science Foundation, Department
of  Transportation,  Department  of  Commerce,  Department  of Education  and
Environmental  Protection  Agency provide  detailed  descriptions  of all the  non-
classified  research taking place  in that department  or agency.  Each  agency also
publishes  comprehensive  instructions  for newly  established  or existing SMEs  to
submit  proposals  to  explore  the  commercial  potential  of government  funded
research taking place in participating departments  or agencies.  Each agency  sets
aside  1.25% of its research budget to finance these commercial  feasibility studies.
Each  agency  reviews  its  proposals  on  the  basis  of their  technical  merit  and
potential commercial  application.
Proposals that pass the review process receive Phase I funding of up to $100,000
to  cover  100%  of eligible  costs  for  six months.  In effect,  Phase  I funding  can
serve as  the seed capital  for a newly established  SME,  if the SME has access to
equipment and facilities to conduct the required research.  The objective of Phase
I funding is to determine  the scientific and technical merit of a proposed research
idea.  Phase II  funding provides  an additional  $750,000  of seed  capital to cover
100%  of eligible  R&D  expenses  for an  additional  two  years.  The  objective  of
Phase  II funding is to demonstrate  the commercial  feasibility of a research  idea.
Only 40% of the proposals that receive Phase  I funding are selected for Phase  II
funding.  By  the  end of Phase  II,  a  proposal  is  expected  to have  demonstrated
sufficient technical  and  commercial  feasibility  to attract private funds  to  finance
the  remaining  steps  to  successful  commercialization.  The  private  enterprise
receiving  Phase  I  and  Phase  H funding  has  full  commercial  rights  to  all  the
profits, IP, and research data.
Recommendation  #1OB.  Transfer ownership of government-funded  IP to the
research  institute or university  where  it was  created . As  the discussion in
Also see, David Audretsch,  "The Dynamic Role of Small Firms, Evidence from the US," World Bank
Institute Working Paper,  2001. Applications  and official SBIR program details are available on the US
Small  Business  Administration's  web  site  at  www.sba.gov.  The  SBIR  program  was  renewed  by
Congress  in 1996 with no dissenting  votes.  Among the firms  that received early stage financing from
SBIR  are  Apple  Computer,  Chiron,  Intel  and  Compaq.  A  description  and  summary  of  several
evaluations of the SBIR program is available in Wendy  Schacht, "Small Business Innovation Research
Program," Congressional Research Service  Report for Congress. December 28, 2000.
67  Russia is hoping to attract  additional  venture capital  flows, but venture  capitalists  generally  complain
that there  is not sufficient deal flow to make Russia a profitable,  worthwhile market.  A program  such
as SBIR could contribute  to the solution of this particular problem.
- 40 -Section  HI  indicated,  ownership  of IP  funded in whole  or in  part  with budget
resources  remains  unclear.  This  murky  ownership  status  hampers
commercialization,  deters  foreign  investments  and  leaves  Russia's  intellectual
resources open to unauthorized duplication in the West and elsewhere.  Moreover,
matching  grant  programs,  SBIR,  or  other  programs  designed  to  bridge  the
innovation  gap  and  catalyze  private  research  funding  cannot  succeed  as long  as
the ownership of the [P generated by these collaborative  arrangements  remains in
doubt.  Thus, clarifying  IP ownership is not only essential to improve the quality
of government R&D  spending.  It  is also  essential  to facilitate more  productive
linkages  between  SMEs  and  larger  domestic  and  foreign  enterprises,  attract
venture  capital,  commercialize  Russia's  existing  stock  and  new  flow  of
innovations,  and  generally  facilitate  Russia's  transition  to  a  more  productive
position in the global  knowledge economy.  The OECD  experience  suggests that
transferning  ownership  of  government-funded  IP  to  the  research  institute  or
university where the innovation was created is the most effective way to eliminate
these ambiguities  and  uncertainties  and generate  successful  government-industry
R&D collaboration and IP commercialization  programs.
Four  critical  factors  determine  the  success  of these  OECD  collaboration  and
commercialization  programs.  The  first  is the  replacement  of uncertainty  with
clarity in  terms of actual  ownership.  The  second  is the  establishment  of clear
commercialization  rules  of  the  game  - e.g.,  who  is  responsible  for
commercialization?  How  are  the  financial  returns  of  technology
commercialization  divided  between  the  inventor,  the  organization  bearing  the
financial risk of commercialization, the owner of the IP, and the Government, if it
is  not  the  owner?  The  third  is  the  establishment  of effective  organizational
arrangements  to  manage  and implement  the  commercialization  process,  starting
with the filing of domestic  and international  patent applications and ending with
the  collection  and  distribution  of  royalties  generated  by  successfully
commercialized  innovations.  And the fourth and final is the development of clear
mechanisms  to promote the growth of new, science intensive  SMEs and to ensure
that  innovations  are  used  to  improve  the  global  competitiveness  of  domestic
enterprises in general.
None of these  factors  and  mechanisms  presently  exist  in Russia.  There  is  an
active  discussion  of who  should  own  government  funded  IP,  how  to  value
government-funded  IP  for  property  tax  purposes,  and  how  to  prepare  a
comprehensive  inventory  of  past  Government  funded  IP.  For  all 'practical
purposes, this is destined to be a dead end exercise with no tangible benefit for the
economy  unless  GOR  establishes  a  comprehensive  system,  not  only  of IP
ownership, but of IP commercialization.
For example, the US Government operates a large number of government  funded
defense and civilian research programs, maintains  a large number  of government
owned laboratories  and federal research facilities,  and is generally  recognized to
have  one  of the  most  successful  IP  commercialization  programs  in  terms  of
clarifying  ownership,  converting  inventions  into  products  and  industrial
processes,  and  developing  new,  dynamic  SMEs.  These  programs  rest  on two
- 41  -critical pillars.  The first is the recognition that the Government was not and could
never  be  an  effective  owner  of IP.  Therefore,  the US Government  transferred
ownership  of govermment  funded  IP to  the  university  or institute  where  it was
created.  The  second  pillar  was  the  development  of rules  and  regulations
specifying  the  university  or  research  institute's  rights  and  responsibilities  for
commercializing  the government-funded  IP  and the  establishment of institutions
dedicated to technology commercialization  at institutes  and universities.  Annex  2
describes these arrangements  in greater detail.
Recommendation  #1OC.  Establish  Technology  Transfer Offices  at Russian
universities and research institutes and train the management cadre that will
operate these  centers.  Transferring  ownership  of govermment  funded IP  to the
university  or  research  institute  where  it  was  created  is  a  necessary,  but  not
sufficient  step toward  the creation  of an effective  technology  commercialization
system.  To bridge  the  so-called  "exploitation  gap," - i.e.,  the  gap  between the
number  of inventions  that  are  created  and  the  number  that  are  actually put  to
commercial  use  --  many  countries  found  that  it was  also  essential  to establish
specialized  institutions  with  trained  personnel  dedicated  to  licensing  this  IP  to
those  foreign  and  domestic  enterprises  who  will  invest  the  time  and  resources
required  to  develop  commercially  viable  products  based  on  this  IP.  These
specialized  institutions --  Technology Transfer Offices  (TTO)  as they are known
in the US and Industrial  Liaison Offices  (ILO) as they are known in the United
Kingdom  --  generally  perform  the  following  range  of  functions:  apply  for
domestic  and  foreign  patents,  pay the  necessary  patent  application  and  annual
patent maintenance fees, license the patented IP, enforce ownership rights against
alleged  infringement,  collect  royalties  from  license  holders,  and  distribute
royalties  according  to  a  pre-determined  formula  between  the  TTO  (to  cover
administrative  expenses), the institute  our university where  the  IP was invented,
and  the  inventor(s).68 Although  TTOs  are  not  designed  to  be  self-supporting
profit  centers,  US  experience  suggests  that  they  can  eventually  become  self
sustaining  within  approximately  10  years.  In  most  successful  Technology
Transfer Office, gross royalties and licensing fees generated by the TTO generally
amount to between 0.5% and 2% of the institute's or university's  annual research
budget.69
68  lTOs  have  the  added  advantage  of  being  decentralized  institutions.  Rather  than  one  central
government  agency  attempting  to  cormnercialize  the  entire  stock of government  funded  IP,  each
university  or  institute  in  the  US  establishes  its  own  ITO  dedicated  to  commercializing  the
technology  generated  in that  institution.  Experience  indicates  that  rather than  breeding  wasteful
duplication,  this  decentralized  approach  generates  innovation,  competition,  experimentation  and
success.  Moreover,  a well functioning  TIO can be a tool to help  attract investors to  a region  and
establish partnerships  between local and foreign business  on the one hand and the university on the
other.  In  this  respect,  a  T1O  can  be  an  important  ingredient  in  a  comprehensive  regional
development program.
69  As this data suggests, the real economic value of establishing lTOs and clarifying IP ownership has
little connection to the ensuing licensing fees.  On average,  these fees are rather meager.  Rather,  the
economic  value  to the government  and society  is derived from the  economic  activity generated  by
the commercialization  process  itself  This includes  the establishment  of new  high tech  SMEs, the
- 42  -To help establish  TTOs  as an integral  feature  of the Russian  S&T sector,  GOR
should provide matching grants to finance (i) a portion of the initial start up costs
and first  few  years  of operating costs  to  support the creation of a decentralized
system of TTOs in different regions  of Russia.  The TTOs should be established
at  both  universities  and  major  research  institutes  that  both  appear  to  have
technology with potential  commercial  applications  and are willing to bear part of
the  cost  of  establishing  and  operating  TTOs;  (ii)  a  portion  of the  cost  of
conducting  expert  technology  audits  at  the  selected  institutes  and  universities.
The  purpose  of  these  audits  would  be  to  ascertain  what  technologies  and
innovations, if any, have potential  commercial  application;70 (iii)  a portion of the
cost  of applying  for  and  maintaining  foreign  patents.  Not  every  innovation
identified by the audit will be eligible  for patent protection  or worth the cost of
patent  protection.  Therefore,  GOR  should  establish  some  sort  of transparent,
competitive,  expert evaluation  system  for  selecting  which innovations  would  be
eligible to receive  foreign  patent protection  grants.  (iv)  training personnel  in the
legal,  financial  and  technical  aspects  of establishing  and  operating  a  TTO.
Training  could  include  such  topics  as  case  studies  on  how  TTOs  operate  in
different  countries,  the  mechanics  of conducting  a  technology  audit,  how  to
market innovations  and search  for licensees,  different strategies  for managing IP,
and different strategies for linking the TTO to the institute's overarching research
and innovation mission.
Finally,  OECD experience  suggests that institutions such as TTOs should not be
seen  as  an  isolated  component  of the  national  innovation  system.  Instead,  to
maximize  their effectiveness,  they  should be  linked,  both  institutionally  and in
terms  of policy initiatives  to  complementary  activities  to bridge  the  innovation
barrier (Recommendation  10a, above) and establish incubators to help nurture the
development of promising high tech SMEs.
creation  of well  paying,  skilled jobs  and  the  additional  tax revenues  generated  by this additional
economic  activity.  To  the extent  that participants  in the  IP ownership  discussions  in Russia  are
fighting over imagined royalties, they are bound to be disappointed.  To the extent that the fight over
royalties  detracts  from  the  creation  of  an  effective  IP  commercialization  system,  the  Russian
economy will lose not only royalties, but jobs, new businesses and taxes.
70  The  audits  recommended  here  differ  substantially  from  much  of the  technology  audit  activities
currently underway  in Russia.  Those audits  are  designed primarily to identify innovations so  that
they can be  taxed  (even before  they  have  been commercialized)  or the  state to  claim ownership.
Either  way,  these  audits  create  a  clear  incentive  for  institutes  to  hide  their  innovations.  By
comnparison,  the  audits  recommended  here  would  be  undertaken  as  part  of  a  comprehensive
commercialization program that would include transfer of ownership to the institutes or universities
where the innovation was created,  the establishment  of a rational tax policy (based on best practice
examples gleaned from the OECD) with respect to IP that has not yet been commercialized,  and the
establishment of a decentralized system of TTOs.
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Russia's Intellectual  Property Laws and the WTO
By all accounts, existing Russian legislation in the area of patents, trademarks, copyright,
etc.  is  fully  compliant  with  Trade  Related  Aspects  of Intellectual  Property  Rights
(TRIPS)  and  WTO  requirements.  The  main  weakness  with  Russia's  IP  laws  lies  in
compliance  and enforcement,  but not the  laws themselves.  This Annex provides a brief
description of the WTO and TRIPS related aspects of Russia's intellectual property laws
and  a brief description  of the  compliance  and  enforcement  weaknesses  highlighted  by
most analysts.
TRIPS and the WTO
Russia  expects  to  become  a  member  of the  World  Trade  Organization.  As  a  WTO
member,  it will  be required,  inter alia, to bring its national  IP legislation  in compliance
with the provisions  of the Agreement  on Trade-Related  Aspects of Intellectual  Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).
The  TRIPS  Agreement  was  developed  during  the  1986-94  Uruguay  Round  of trade
negotiations  under the WTO umbrella at the initiative of developed  countries and became
binding on all WTO members  in early 1999. While The TRIPS Agreement builds on pre-
existing  international  IPR  conventions,  it  is  by  far  the  most  sweeping  agreement  on
intellectual property rights to date.
The  TRIPS  Agreement  stipulates  that  member  countries  must  apply  the principles  of
most-favored  nation (MEN)  and national  treatment of intellectual property protection  to
all participating  members.  Under  the Agreement,  all forms  of IPRs are  to be protected:
copyright  and  contiguous  rights;  trademarks;  use  of  geographic  names;  industrial
patterns; patents; microchip topology, and trade secrets.
For each form  of IPR, the "Agreement  defines the main elements  of protection, namely,
the subject-matter to be protected,  the rights to be conferred,  and permissible exception to
those rights.  For the  first time  in  an  intemational  agreement  on intellectual  property,
TRIPS  addresses  the  enforcement  of IPRs  by establishing  basic  measures  designed  to
ensure that legal  remedies will be  available  to  title holders  to  defend their rights.  The
Agreement  also  makes  disputes  between  WTO members  with  respect  to  their  TRIPS
obligations subject to the WTO's integrated dispute settlement procedures.",71
In assessing Russia's  compliance with the WTO  IPR requirements,  it is not sufficient to
consider only  the quality and content of the existing legislation.  Equally important is the
quality of the  enforcement  regime.  The consensus of most  observers  inside and outside
Russia is that while Russia's laws on the protection of intellectual property are generally
71  Carlos A. Primo  Braga,  Carsten Fink, and Claudia Paz Sepulveda,  Intellectual Property  Rights and
Economic Development. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 412, March 2000.
- 44 -well drafted and meet international  standards, the  enforcement procedures are weak and
in need of upgrading to ensure full compliance with TRIPS obligations.
A.  Legal Framework
With respect  to Russia's legal  framework,  the World Intellectual  Property Organization
(WIPO) has appraised Russia's legal base governing intellectual property and  found it to
be in general compliance  with the TRIPS provisions. Russia's  domestic legal protection
framework is quite extensive  and covered by over 100 legal acts72. In addition, Russia is
a  signatory  to  a number of earlier  International  Conventions  in  the  field of intellectual
Property Rights73 which predated the TRIPS Agreement.
Nevertheless,  Russia still needs to make some adjustments to bring its national legislation
into full compliance with TRIPS. For example74:
*  Industrial Patterns.  The  Patent Law on protection of industrial patterns is  in
general  compliance  with  the  TRIPS  provisions  with  the  exception  of the
norms related to the criteria of eligibility of patterns for protection.  Article 25
of TRIPS on "Conditions of providing protection" stipulates that protection be
given  to  all  independently  created  new  and  original  patterns.  The  Russian
Patent  Law,  by comparison,  stipulates  that,  to  be  eligible  for protection,  a
pattern  must  not  only be  new and  original,  but  also  industrially  applicable
through  its multiple  replication  by way of manufacturing  of the  appropriate
articles.
72  The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 44') the Civil Code (Articles  128, 138,  139 etc.,)
the Crimninal Code (Articles  146,  181 etc.,) the Law "On Copyright and Contiguous Rights,"  the Law
"On  Legal  Protection  of  Comnputer  Software  and  Databases,"  the  Patent  Law,  the  Law  "On
Trademarks,  Service  Marks,  and  Denomination  of  Place  of  Origin  of  Goods,"  the  Code  of
Administrative  Offences, and a number of the other laws and regulatory acts. A complete  list of legal
acts in the field of legal protection of IPRs is available at the web site http://www.ipr.inage.ru
73  gurasian  Patent Convention,  World  Copyright  Treaty,  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization,
Paris  Convention  for  the  Protection  of Industrial  Property,  Patent  Cooperation  Treaty,  Beme
Convention  for  the  Protection  of Literary  and  Artistic  Works,  and  Geneva  Convention  for  the
Protection  of Producers  of Phonogramns  Against Unauthorized  Duplication  of Their  Phonograms.
For a description of these international  conventions and treaties and Russia's obligations therein, see
Improvement of the Policy and Regulatorv Framework:  Small and Medium Enterprise Development,
Part  D,  "Patents  and  Intellectual  Property  Right  Development,"  unpublished  ms.,  Moscow,  June
2000.
74  A more detailed  description of the technical  amendments that will be required to bring Russia's IP
legislation and enforcement  procedures  up to TRIPS standards, see Improvements  of the Policy and
Regulatory  Framework.  op.  cit.,  and  Chapter  1 of Natalia  Zolotykh  et.  al.,  Creation  Of Legal.
Organizational  And Economic  Conditions  For Innovation  Activity As  A Factor Of Activation  Of
Effective Modernization  Of Branches  Of Industr  Report On The "Analysis Of The  Status Of The
Innovation System Of The Russian  Federation"  Prepared Under Contract N ERB  IC1  5-CT98-1002,
stage N 1, 1999.
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and  patterns  are  in  general  compliance  with  the  provisions  of the  Paris
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement with the exception of the TRIPS norms
regarding  the  use  of  invention  without  the  permission  of patent  holder
("forced  licensing").  Article  31  of  TRIPS  on  "Other  uses  without  the
permission of patent holder"  significantly restricts the use of protected patent
without  the holder's  permission,  and  allows  usage  only under  a number  of
limited  specific  conditions  (forced  licensing  terms).  The  current  Russian
legislation,  by  comparison,  allows  the  use  of  protected  patent  without
holder's consent in many more circumstances.
B.  Enforcement  Practice
However, the real challenge and reform agenda in Russia today with respect to IPRs lie in
the improvement  of the enforcement practice.  The scale of violations and infringement
of intellectual property in Russia has been the subject of much concern, notably amongst
Western  governments  and  manufacturers  in the  face  of their increased  losses  in  sales,
royalties  and  markets  shares.75 IPRs  most  frequently  subject  to  piracy  in Russia  are
products  of the  music  business  (about  75%),  video  products  (about  85%),  computer
software  (97%),  and products of the publishing business  (45%).  In  recent years,  Russia
has  become  a  major distributor  of counterfeit  goods,  servicing  not  only its  domestic
market  but  increasingly  exporting  pirated  merchandise  to  Eastem  Europe,  the  FSU,
Turkey,  Israel,  etc.  The  Russian  Anti-Piracy  Software  Association  (RAPSA)  even
reported one instance in which the coding and design of a new computer game had been
stolen  from  Western  manufacturers  at  an  early  stage of product  development.  Pirated
copies, with technical  improvements  introduced  by the  pirates,  were released in  Russia
before non-pirated copies were available in the West.
Despite  the  presence  of  strong,  comprehensive  IPR  legislation,  IP  protection  and
enforcement  in  Russia  is  cumbersome  and  often  unreliable  owing  notably  to  the
inexperience  and reluctance  of the judicial  and  investigative  systems.  As one observer
noted  recently,  "Investigators  are  not  ready to  investigate  infringement  of intellectual
property  rights  either psychologically  (e.g.,  a violation of intellectual  property  rights  is
not comparable to murder or robbery and, therefore is considered a less serious crime), or
procedurally  (e.g.,  there  are  no  agreed  methods  on  how  to  investigate  such cases  and
collect evidence)."  In addition, judges  seem to  lack  expertise  in  IPR issues  which has
often  resulted  in  what  Westem  observers  consider  to  be  miscarriages  of justice  and
arbitrary dismissals of complaints regarding violation of IPRs by Russian courts76.
75  For example, the US  Government reported recently that "Russia's record on the actual protection of
intellectual property  has been inadequate  at best in the past decade,  and the country  is on the  [US
Government's]  301  watch  list  for  IPR  infringements."  For  details  see,  Svetlana  Kuzmichenko,
Protection Of Intellectual  Propertv Rights (IPR) In Russia And In Russia's Primorsky Krai, BISNIS,
US Department of Commerce, May 2001.
76  For example,  in 1997, the Russian Commercial Courts accepted over 340,000 lawsuits of which only
121  were  connected  with  the  protection  of intellectual  property  rights.  A  survey of Commercial
courts  in  nine  jurisdictions  found  172  IPR  cases  in  1998.  Of those  filed  by  foreign  plaintiffs,
- 46 -In view of the poor enforcement  record of the Russian system, private manufacturers  and
distributors have  sought to  organize themselves  and create several  associations  to assist
them  in the protection  of their intellectual  property  rights through daily  work with  and
technical assistance to local police, courts, customs, and other governmental  authorities7'.
Among  other  activities,  these  organizations  are  pushing  for  reforms  to  strengthen
Russia's  legal  and enforcement  framework  against piracy.  Two items  are high on their
agenda.  First, they are  lobbying  for an amendment  to Article  146 of the Penal Code.
Article  146  currently  specifies  that  criminal  sanctions  are  applicable  only  if the  IPR
violation  causes  "substantial  damage."  Russian  courts,  however,  have  ruled that  even
millions of dollars of damages may not be substantial when measured against the balance
sheet  of such  firms  as  Microsoft  or  Sony.  The  proposed  amendment  would  allow
criminal  sanctions  to  be  applied whenever  damages  exceed  some  absolute  threshold  -
e.g.,  $10,000.  Second,  current  law  states  that  a  complaint  can  be  filed  only  if the
complainant  is physically  present  in the Russia.  However,  many firms  that have been
damaged by piracy are represented by distributors.  Because they do not have an official
legal presence  in Russia, they do not have the legal standing to file a complaint.  And the
courts  and police  will not  act unless  an official complaint  is filed.  A second proposed
amendment  would  correct  this perceived  deficiency  by allowing  complaints to be filed
even if the complainant is not a legal resident of Russia.
approximately half were successful.  The Moscow Prosecutor's  Office had over 30 criminal cases on
infringement of intellectual property rights in 1998, of which only  11  claims reached Russian courts;
the rest were rejected, and there were only 3 verdicts of guilty.
"  For  example,  there  are  four  anti-piracy  associations  in  Moscow  alone:  the  Russian  Anti-Piracy
Organization  (RAPO)  (which  coordinates  actions  involving motion  pictures),  Business  Software
Alliance (BSA),  International Federation of Phonographic  Industry (IFPI), and Russian Anti-Piracy
Software Association (RAPSA).
-47  -Annex  2
Commercializing  IP:  The US Experience
Several countries have developed different models ranging from transfer of ownership of
all government-funded  IP to the private sector (US) to a system in which the state retains
some ownership  rights  and actively promotes  commercialization  of government  funded
S&T (UK,  France,  Germany,  Japan).  Despite their differences,  these  systems  all  work
reasonably  well.  Thus,  the real question  is not "who  owns"  government  funded  IP but
rather how  government-funded  IP  can be  introduced  into  the economic  turnover.  This
Annex  will  describe  the  US  approach,  in  part  because  the  US  model  is  generally
recognized  as  an  example  of international  best  practice  and  also  because  this  is  the
approach which many in GOR say that they wish to emulate.
The  US  approach  to  ownership  and  commercialization  of government-funded  IP  is
codified  in two major pieces  of legislation  - the Bayh-Dole  Act (P.L.  96-517)  and the
Stevenson-Wydler  Act (P.L. 96-418), both approved in  1980.  Both laws are designed to
encourage  the  commercialization  of R&D  that  was  funded  by,  or  developed  by  the
government.  Bayh-Dole pertains to the ownership of patents resulting from government-
funded  R&D  that was  performed  in non-government  facilities  - e.g.,  universities,  non-
profit  research  laboratories,  etc. Stevenson-Wydler  pertains to the  ownership  of patents
resulting from cooperative research efforts between government research laboratories and
outside partners where there is no direct federal funding to the outside partner.78
Both laws were based on the premise that simply funding more basic research would not
solve  the  US  technology  commercialization  problem.  On  the  contrary,  technology
commercialization  is  not  a  linear  process  in  which  more  basic  research  inputs
automatically  generate  complementary  applied  research,  development,
commercialization,  and diffusion of the results into the economy.  The problem with the
US  in  the  1980s  was  that despite  its overall  strength  in basic  research,  other countries
were commercializing  the results.  A second related premise was that the US government
had not been an effective owner of the IP which it had already created and funded.  At the
time both  laws were passed, the USG owned  approximately  28,000 patents.  But  fewer
than 5% of these inventions were licensed for commercial use.79 The remainder lay idle.
The reasons  for this  low  level  of commercialization  are  complex.  First,  and  perhaps
foremost,  not every invention  is commercially  viable.  Markets  simply do not exist  for
every  interesting  invention.  Second,  studies  indicate  that  research  accounts  for
approximately  25% of the cost of bringing a new product to market. USG agencies  have
78  For details see Wendy Schacht, 'Tatent Ownership  and Federal Research and Development (R&D):
A  Discussion  of  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  and  the  Stevenson-Wydler  Act,  (Congressional  Research
Service:  The  Library  of Congress,  December  11,  2000).  Note:  CRS  reports  are  not  generally
available  to  the  public  although  they  can  occasionally  be  found  on  the  internet  or obtained  via
Congressional  offices.  CRS reports cited in this note were obtained directly from the CRS.
79  U.S.  Government  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  Report  to  Congressional  Committees  entitled
"Technology  Transfer: Administration of the Bayh-Dole Act by Research Universities, May 7, 1998.
- 48 -neither  the  mandate  nor  the  capability  to  finance  the  remaining  75%  of the  costs  of
commercializing  inventions or determining which inventions  have commercial potential.
Simply stated, the government was not well  suited for the venture capital business.  Last
but not least, prior to the passage of  these laws, the Government refused to relinquish title
to  federally-funded  inventions.  Instead,  it  retained  title  and  granted  non-exclusive
licenses to anyone who wanted to utilize the invention.  Since companies could not obtain
ownership of the patent or exclusive licenses to exploit government-funded  inventions or
inventions  developed  in government  laboratories,  they were unwilling  to go through  the
expense and effort of developing new products based on these inventions.
Bayh-Dole  and  Stevenson-Wydler  were  designed  to  clarify  ownership  of government
funded IP, but more importantly,  to ensure  that government funded inventions  were put
into  economic  circulation.  They  explicitly  encourage  cooperation  between  research
institutes,  universities,  laboratories  conducting  fundamental  research,  and  domestic
industry  to  ensure  that the  fruits  of research  are  not  locked  in  the  laboratory  but  are
actively used as an economic  resource to promote growth and the competitiveness  of US
industry.  This has proven to be especially useful for defense-oriented  research.80 Rather
than  keeping  the  research  bottled  up  in  defense  products,  Bayh-Dole  and  Stevenson-
Wydler protect US national  security interests  while simultaneously providing incentives
for private  industry  to  use  these  inventions  for the  widest  possible  range  of civilian
applications.
At least in this limited respect, the problem facing the US in 1980 and Russia in 2001  are
similar.  In both  countries,  inventions  were  sitting  idle  and were  not being  used  as  a
resource for wealth generation.  But at least for the US,  the solution to this problem was
not just a question of ownership rights.  Indeed,  prior to the passage of Bayh-Dole  and
Stevenson Wydler, the ownership status of these US inventions was already clear - these
inventions  belonged  to  the US  government.  Rather,  as  the discussion  below  of Bayh-
Dole will illustrate, the solution was much more about creating economic incentives and
mechanisms to foster the commercialization than about clarifying ownership.
A.  Bavh-Dole
Bayh-Dole  is  based  on  a  simple  premise:  although  budget  funds  were  financing  the
development  of  inventions,  taxpayers  were  not  benefiting  from  the  economic
development  (and  financial  return  to  the  government  in  the  form  of  increased  tax
revenues)  that  would  result  from  the  successful  manufacture  and  sale  of products
produced  as a result of these inventions.  In passing  Bayh-Dole, Congress  decided that
the public interest would best be served if title to budget-funded inventions were passed
to those institutions  --  universities,  small businesses  or non-profit  research  institutes  -
where  the  inventions  were  created.  But there was  a caveat.  These  institutions  could
retain  title  only  if  they  diligently  promoted  commercialization  by  licensing  the
80  As one analyst observed recently,  "While the major portion of total federal R&D spending has been
in the defense arena, govermment-financed  work has led or contributed to new commercial products
and processes including, but not limited to, antibiotics, plastics, jet aircraft, computers,  electronics,
and genetically engineered drugs."  Cited in Wendy Schacht,  op.  cit.. p. 7.
-49  -innovations for use by commercial enterprises.  The institutions would earn licensing fees
and  royalties  (generally  ranging  between  3%  and  6%),  thereby  giving  them  a  strong
incentive  to  promote  commercialization.  The  enterprises  would  receive  an  exclusive
license  to use the invention,  thereby  giving  them an incentive  to use  corporate  funds to
commercialize  the invention.  The USG  would not share in the license  fees or royalties
(especially  since  universities  are non-taxable  institutions  and  therefore  would  not  pay
taxes on the  royalties  earned  and were  under no other obligation to share royalties with
the  government).  Nevertheless,  the  government  would  profit  from  the  new jobs  and
increased  taxes  eventually  generated  by  the  increased  economic  activity  spawned  by
government-funded  inventions. As the Bayh-Dole Act declares:
It  is the  policy  and  objective  of the  Congress  to  use  the  patent  system  to
promote  the  utilization  of  inventions  arising  from  federally-supported
research and development;  ...  to promote collaboration  between commercial
concerns  and nonprofit  organizations,  including  universities;  to  ensure  that
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used
in  a  manner  to  promote  free  competition  and  enterprise,  to  promote  the
commercialization  of public  availability  of inventions  made  in  the United
States by US industry and labor;  [and] to ensure that the Government  obtains
sufficient rights  in  federally-  supported  inventions  to meet the  needs of the
Government and to protect the public  against nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions.
8 1
To  achieve  these objective,  the  Bayh-Dole Act along with  subsequent amendments  and
implementing regulations82 provide for the following:
e  The  provisions  apply to  all  inventions  developed  in  the  course  of a  federal
grant,  contract,  or  cooperative  agreement.  The  provisions  apply  even  if the
federal govermment  is not the sole source of funding.
S1  Cited in Appendix B, "Excerpts  from the Bayh-Dole Act," in Technology Commercialization.  op.
cit.
82  An excellent summary of the Bayh-Dole  Act  is available in  "The Bayh-Dole  Act:  A Guide to the
Law and Implementing  Regulations,"  Council on Government Relations, September  1999, (web site:
htp://www.ucop.edu/ott/bavh/html  Also  see  Mark  W.  Crowell,  "Conmmercializing  University
Technology"  in  Technologv  Commercialization:  Russian  Challenges,  American  Lessons.  oR  cit.;
Wendy Schacht,  "Patent Ownership  and Federal Research  and Development (R&D):  A Discussion
of the  Bayh-Dole  Act  and  the  Stevenson-Wydler  Act,"  (Congressional  Research  Service:  The
Library of Congress, December  11, 2000)  and Wendy  Schacht,  "R&D Partnerships  and Intellectual
Property:  Implications  for US Policy,"  (Congressional  Research  Service:  The  Library  of Congress,
December 6, 2000) (web site  http://www.cnie.org/nle/st-19.html  . Final rules for implementing  the
Bayh-Dole  Act  were  published  on  March  18,  1987  and  codified  at  37  CFR  part 401.1-401.16.
According  to  the  Council  on  Government  Relations  brochure  cited  above,  "these
regulations.. .specify  the rights  and obligations  of all  parties  involved  and constitute  the  operating
manual  for technology transfer on a national basis." This portion of the Code of Federal Regulations
can be accessed at the web site http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx  00/37cfr401_00.html
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university) may retain title to inventions made as a result of government-funded
R&D.83
*  The university has an obligation to disclose each  new invention to the  funding
agency within two months of its discovery.
*  Within  two  years  after  disclosure,  the  university  must  decide  if it  wishes  to
retain title to the invention.
*  If the university deternines that it wishes to retain title to the invention, it must
file  for  a US patent within  one year.  Within ten months of the US  filing,  the
university must indicate if it will  file for foreign patents.  If it chooses not to,
the US government can file for foreign patents in its own name.
*  If the  university  retains  title,  it  must  provide  the  government  with  a  non-
revocable license to use the invention.
*  Any company holding  a license to a patent that involves sales of product in the
US must substantially manufacture the product in the US unless it can be shown
that this is not economically feasible.
*  In marketing inventions  to licensees,  universities must give preference  to small
business  firms  (less  than  500  employees)  provided  that these  firms  have  the
resources and capability of commercializing the invention.
*  If the invention was not commercialized  within a reasonable period of time, the
federal government  can compel the university to grant  a license to a third party
or the government can reclaim title and grant licenses itself.  (These are the so-
called "march-in"  rights.)
*  Universities must share royalty and license income from the invention with the
inventor.  It must use the remaining  income to cover the cost of maintaining a
university  technology  transfer  office  and  to  support  scientific  research  and
84 education.
83  Bayh-Dole  allows  universities,  small  business,  and  nonprofit  organizations  to  own  inventions
developed with budget funding.  However, a Presidential  Memorandum  issued by President Reagan
on March  18,  1983  extended  the benefit of Bayh-Dole  to large  for-profit  organizations  as  well as
small  businesses.  That  Memorandum  is  still  in  effect  and  is codified  in  the  Code  of Federal
Regulations cited above.
84  Excellent descriptions of university technology  licensing procedures  and the operation of university
technology  management  offices  can  be  found  in Universitv  Technology  Transfer:  Ouestions  and
Answers  Council  on  Governmental  Relations,  November  30,  1993  (available  at  the  web  site
http:/Hwww.coer.edu/ga.htm  . Another excellent  source of information is available at the web site of
the Association of University Technology Managers  htt=:H/www.autnmnet
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inventions.  For example,  in  1980,  approximately  25-30  universities  were  engaged  in
technology  transfer.  Between  1974  and  1984,  84  universities  applied  for 4105  patents
and  received  2944  patents.  Licensing  income  reported  by  112  universities  in  1986
amounted to $30 million. By comparison,  in  1999  alone,  190 universities, hospitals  and
nonprofit research organizations  reported85:
*  Approximately  $41  billion of economic  activity,  supporting  271,000 jobs was
attributed to the results of academic licensing;
*  Adjusted gross license income was $862 million;
*  5545 US patent applications were filed and 3661  patents were issued;
*  3914 new licenses  were issued and  18,617  licenses were outstanding.  Almost
2/3 of the new licenses were issued to small businesses;
*  The business activity associated  with the  sale of licensed products is estimated
to generate approximately $5 billion of federal, state and regional tax revenue.
B.  Stevenson-Wydler
Whereas  Bayh-Dole  concerns  the  ownership  and  commercialization  of government-
funded inventions  created in universities,  Stevenson-Wydler  addresses the ownership  of
inventions  created  in  the  course  of  cooperative  research  ventures  between  private
enterprises  and government  laboratories.  The basic  rationale  for the legislation  was  an
attempt to  create closer linkages between  federal laboratories  conducting basic  research
and private industry,  on the grounds that this would generate significant benefits  for both
parties.  The basic building block  of Stevenson-Wydler  is the  cooperative  research  and
development  agreement  (CRADA),  which  defines  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the
cooperative venture between a federal laboratory and private enterprise.
Pursuant  to  Stevenson-Wydler,  the  work  performed  by  a  federal  laboratory  under  a
CRADA  must be  consistent  with  the  laboratory's  basic  mission.  Both  parties  to  the
CRADA may share personnel,  services and property.  However,  the federal  government
may not provide  any direct  funding to  the private partner.  Although Wydler-Stevenson
does not mandate any specific disposition of IP created  in the course  of the CRADA,  it
permits  the  federal  laboratory  to  transfer  ownership  of the  resulting  IP  to  the private
enterprise.  As with Bayh-Dole,  the federal  govemment  must be given a  non-exclusive,
irrevocable,  paid up license to use the technology throughout the world.
85  1999  data  are  from  The  Association  of University  Technology  Managers,  Inc.,  report  entitled,
AUTM  Licensing  Survey.  FY  1999:  A  Survey  Summarv  of Technology  Licensing  (and Related)
Performance  for U.S.  and  Canadian  Academic  and Nonprofit  Institutions  and Patent  Management
Firms.
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Public Sector Support To Innovation:
The Case Of France
With  only about half of its R&D  investment  financed  by the private  sector,  France  is
below  OECD average  of 2/3 private financing.  The Government of France believed that
too many valuable ideas  from Government-funded  research remained  underutilized  and
thus decided  to take  action.  With that in mind, France  developed  a variety of support
mechanisms for innovative activities.  These include inter  alia  the following:
A.  ANVAR
ANVAR (Agence Nationale  de Valorisation  de la Recherche)  - a Government  Agency -
was set up in  1979 to promote and finance innovation  in French industry with a particular
focus  on SMEs.  Anvar  operates  under  the  auspices  of several  ministries  in charge  of
industry, research and SME development and has an annual budget of approximately 215
million euros.  Since  its  creation,  Anvar  developed  a number  of different  products  and
offers the following services:
*  Financial  support:  Anvar  provides  financial  support  to  innovative  enterprises,
research labs and start-ups  for innovative projects.  Financial  support can take one of
2  forms:  (i)  interest-free  loan  for  up  to  5-6  years,  repayable  if the  project  is
successful,  covering  up  to  50  %  of the  expenditure  related  to  the  innovation  or
technology transfer project or (ii) in some  specific cases  grant financing  for up to 38
000  euros.  Financing  can be  used  for several  purposes  including  to:  (i)  prepare  or
complete  innovation  programs  (market  survey,  design,  patents);  (ii)  facilitate  the
establishment of innovative  companies  ; (iii) enhance  the technology  level of SMEs
(by hiring researchers,  scientific and technical information,  etc..); and (iv) encourage
SMEs  to  become  more  involved  in  European  technological  cooperation  projects
within Eureka (seeking  partners  and drawing  up  formal cooperation  agreements)  or
other similar regional or international initiatives.
Projects  are  evaluated  by Anvar regional officers  and  selected  on the  basis of their
technical,  economic  and financial merits.
*  Partnership  building. "matchmaking"  and information support:  ANVAR uses  its 24
regional offices  and European network to collect and disseminate  information. It also
seeks to  facilitate  partnerships  and interface  between  research,  SMEs  and  financial
providers  through  a  variety  of means  including  a  daily  radio  program  aired  on
Frances'  most famous information  channel  (France-Info) where SMEs can advertise
their projects and financing or technological needs.
It  should  be noted  that the Russian Foundation  for Assistance  to  Small and Innovative
Enterprises  (FASIE)  was  organized  on  a  similar  model.  FASIE  and  ANVAR  have
developed  close  ties  and  are  currently working  on  a cooperative  program  designed  to
foster linkages between Russian and French high-tech SMEs.
-53  -According  to  ANVAR,  from  1981  to  1999,  the  agency  provided  support  to  22,000
companies  and laboratories  and supported over 34000 technological  innovation projects
for a total aggregate budget of 3,13 billion euros.  An Anvar representative  indicated that,
on average, 40% to 50% of the credits provided by Anvar are repaid.
B.  Public Sector Venture Capital
In  the  late  1990s,  the  French  Government  set  up  several  venture  capital  funds  as
instruments  of  its  state  innovation  policy  to  stimulate  the  development  of  new
technologies  and  the  growth  of new  innovative  enterprises  in  sectors  suffering  from
shortage  of private  finance.  This  initiative  was  modeled  after  a  similar  yet  broader
European  initiative  86.  Targeted  sectors  include  life  sciences,  information  technologies,
electronics, new materials and environment.
There are mainly 3 public  venture  funds registered  and supervised by the French Stock
Exchange Regulator. These funds are so called "funds of funds", i.e., instead of investing
directly in companies,  they  finance  and  leverage  existing funds  whose  aim is to  invest
directly in innovative companies.  The total aggregate  size of these funds is approximately
300 million euros.
*  Fonds  Public pour le Capital-Risque  created in  1998: 91.5  million  euros invested
from the French State budget.
*  Fonds BEI-CDC pour le Capital-Risque  also created in  1998:  45.7 million euros
invested  by  the  European  Investment  Bank.  These  two  first  funds  intervene
simultaneously and invest equal amounts in each fund.
*  Fonds  de Promotion  pour le  Capital-Risque  created  in 2000:  150  million euros
contributed  in equal parts by the  European Investment  Bank  and the  Caisse  des
Dep6ts et Consignations.
These  funds take equity participation  in existing FCPRs (Fonds Communs de Placement
a Risque - the French legal entity for venture mutual funds).  Eligible mutual Funds must
be  committed  to  investing  more  than  half of  their  portfolio  in  French  innovative
companies  which  are  less  than  7  years  old  and  75%  of their  portfolio  in  European
companies.  Maximum stake  in one single fund must not exceed 30% of the total capital
under management or 12 million euros.
86  European Investment Fund (EIF):  One of Europe's objective formulated  by the European  Union is
to  foster  an  innovation-based  and  knowledge-based  society.  The  European  Investment  Bank  is
participating  in this  effort  through the European  Investment  Fund (EIF).  EIF  is  EIB's venture  capital
specialized subsidiary focusing on high potential innovative SMEs.  EIF operates as a fund of funds and
intervenes in the early stages of creation where  it seeks to act as a catalyst, i.e., send early signals  out
of to the investment community. By mid 2001, EIF's investments  amounted to 1.2 billion euros spread
amongst  116 venture  capital  funds.  EIF  also operates  EIB's  SME  loan portfolio  guarantees  which
works  with over 70 banks and financial institutions  in the European Union. With a capital of 2 billion
euros,  the overall leverage  effect of the guarantee  program has been evaluated  to amount close  to 20
billion euros.
- 54 -As of end of June 2001, these 3 Funds had invested public funds in 18 FCPRs which had
in tun invested in 267 firms.  Global  capitalization of those  firms  amounted to  about  5
billion  euros.  The  average  investment  in  a  company  was  about  1,2  million  euros.
Companies  operating in  the field of life sciences,  new materials,  industrial  processes  or
communication  and  information  new  technologies  represent  83%  of all invested  funds
and 78% of the number of financed companies.
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Finland's National Innovation System
1. Context
Prior  to  1991,  half of Finland's  exports went to  the  Soviet Union.  The collapse  of the
USSR  combined with  the global  recession of the  1990s had a major impact  on Finland
whose  unemployment  rate soared from  a low 3.5%  in 1990 to a high 20%  in  1993.  To
address  this  situation,  in  1994  the  Finnish  Government  developed  a  new  economic
program which set out to develop Finland as a globalized information society. To achieve
this  objective,  the  Government  designed  an  integrated  and  highly  interactive  National
Innovation System placed under the direct patronage of the President of Finland.
2. Key Features of the National Innovation system
*  Objective:  The  objective  of  the  innovation  system  was  to  strengthen  the
competitiveness  of basic industry while developing new high-tech industries.  The
system was designed to provide  support  for all stages of innovation and business
development  starting from  R&D or pre-incubation  to production  and linkages to
global markets.
*  Structure:  Key organizations  included in the innovation system are: the Academy
of Finland, the  National Technology Agency (TEKES),  Public  and private R&D
organizations; Technology transfer agencies and capital providers. Together, these
organizations provide the following comprehensive  set of services:
1.  R&D/ Technology support
2.  Risk financing including equity,  soft loans and grants
3.  Access to International market
4.  Training and development of entrepreneurial and technical skills
5.  Advice on optimal organizational models, and
6.  International linkages
A brief description of the specific functions of each organization is provided below.
Academy  of Finland: its  main  function  is  to  ensure  the  excellence  of basic
research in Finland through competitive funding mechanisms  and to participate in
the formulation of Finland's science policy.
TEKES  (National Technology Agency of Finland): was created in  1983 under the
Ministry of Trade  and Industry to  promote  the technological  competitiveness  of
Finnish  industry,  expand  and  diversify  industrial  production  and promote  high
tech exports. TEKES is the principal public sector implementing arm of Finland's
technology  policy. It provides grants  and soft loans  to innovative  enterprises  for
high  risk  product  development  projects  and  provides  financing  to  research
institutes and universities for applied technical research.
- 56-Public R&D organizations: Public  R&D  organizations  include universities  and
other higher learning institutions  (totaling  about  50), national  research  institutes
and  VTT  (the  Technical  Research  Center  of  Finland).  Combined,  these
organizations  represent  about  30%  of the  total  R&D  national  expenditure.  In
addition  to  public  R&D,  private  sector  R&D  spending  is  also  growing
exponentially  and amounted  to approximately  2% of GDP in  1999.  Overall,  the
Finnish innovation  system  is  characterized  by  a  strong interaction between  the
science base and businesses.
Technology Transfer: Finland'  national  innovation  system  is also  characterized
by its strong focus  on regional  development.  The "Science  Valley" of Kuopio  in
Central  Finland  is  a  product  of effective  technology  transfer  mechanisms  and
productive  interface between  science and business.  Kuopio  is a university town
with a Science Park hosting over 70 high tech companies  employing over 10,000
people  specialized  in  IT,  mechanical  engineering,  materials  technology,
biotechnology and medicine.
Capital  Providers: Finland has  a number of public  and private capital providers
for innovation which  include  S1TRA (the Finnish National Fund for R&D), Start
Fund  of  Kera,  Hermia  (an  incubator  and  seed  capital  provider),  Finnfund
(specializing  in  international  JVs)  and  the  Foundation  for  Finnish  Inventions.
SITRA  , created  in 1967, is the largest public  sector venture  capital provider.  Its
funding is appropriated  by the Finnish Parliament  and is used to provide  (i)  start
up capital for new technology  firms (in 1999,  SITRA was a minority shareholder
in over  90  companies);  (ii)  services  to  match  SMEs  with  business  angels;  (iii)
funds  for  research  projects  in  existing  companies  of any  size;  (iv)  funds  for
training  projects;  (v)  funds  for  technology  transfer  and  (vi)  funds  for  existing
venture capital funds.
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